Decision making theory with geographic information systems support by McFarland, Sean Alan
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Theses Digitization Project John M. Pfau Library 
2008 
Decision making theory with geographic information systems 
support 
Sean Alan McFarland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project 
Recommended Citation 
McFarland, Sean Alan, "Decision making theory with geographic information systems support" (2008). 
Theses Digitization Project. 3393. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/3393 
This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
DECISION MAKING THEORY WITH
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORT
A Project
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino
In Partial Fulfillment
of 'the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Business Administration 
by
Sean Alan McFarland
June 2008
DECISION MAKING THEORY WITH
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS SUPPORT
A Project
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University,
San Bernardino- 
by
Sean Alan McFarland
June 2008
Approved by:
Robert D. Wilson, Ph. D. Date
Chair, Information and Decision Sciences
Javad Varzandeh, Ph. D.
Department Chair
Copyright 2008 Sean Alan McFarland
ABSTRACT
Decisions are made to change the current situation, if 
necessary, to some other future situation. Decisions are
I
made with varying degrees of effectiveness and efficiency 
and are influenced by a myriad of internal and external 
forces. Decision Support Systems (DSS) software can 
effectively aid decision making through processing the 
facts and producing meaningful outputs for use by the 
person or team in making the final choice. Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS), a form of DSS, are very 
effective when locational data are present.
GIS can help to alleviate and neutralize many of the 
internal and external forces, including some interpersonal 
or psychological forces, impacting the decision-making 
process thus allowing for a more controlled, thorough, and 
objective analysis of the issues. Decisions are not made in 
a vacuum and they need data to be effective, which need to 
be transformed into information. GIS have spatial, 
temporal, and statistical tools to assist this 
transformation.
The processes, procedures, and approaches of GIS can 
be applied across a wide variety of business functions 
resulting in improved strategic and operational decisions, 
iii
increased performance, and fresh ways of thinking about 
problems. The applications for which GIS can be utilized 
range from supply chain management to financial management. 
These disciplines have many location-based data and can 
benefit greatly from the analysis of historical patterns 
and the use of temporal processing to forecast likely 
scenarios. GIS can analyze delivery and sales routes, 
safety stock and warehouse usage, and customer demographic 
and purchasing patterns. GIS can aid every step of the 
decision-making process from situation analysis and problem 
identification, to alternative generation and evaluation,
I
and display effective and efficient alternatives.
iv
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CHAPTER ONE
OVERVIEW OF THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
Introduction
Making decisions using location data is not new. 
Records dating back millennia give examples of decisions of 
state and of war. Sun-Tzu's The Art of War dates back to 
about 500 B.C., and the author incorporates geographic 
elements into his decision analysis. This paper will 
examine the decision-making process from many angles using 
the normative approach to examine where objectivity, power, 
and psychographic elements affect it.
The process■starts by developing the issues to address 
and establishes the context for good communications between 
those who will become involved. Next, the problem is 
explored and put into perspective in order to focus 
efforts. Once this is done, alternatives can be generated 
and evaluated leading to a choice. If the process concluded 
that action was necessary then implementation and feedback 
phases would be required. While these phases would normally 
complete the discussion of the decision-making process, it 
would entail a larger scope than was planned for this 
paper.
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After the decision-making process is reviewed, the 
subjects of data1, data mining, decision support systems 
(DSS), and geographic information systems (GIS) are 
introduced and developed. With the understanding of both 
the decision-making process and GIS, this paper proceeds to 
examine the decision process, its implications for the 
organization, and where GIS can and cannot assist decision 
making. The conclusion follows this examination. While a 
formal hypothesis is not postulated for examination stating 
that GIS can benefit, the decision process, this paper 
instead seeks to offer ways in which GIS can contribute to 
a better process and1 outcome. Various appendices are 
offered to provide detail for the discussion. The next 
section will review the literature on decision making to 
see where errors can occur and where assistance needs to be 
sought.
Degision-Making Process
Do Nothing Option
Drucker (1985) stated what most management students 
know; "there is one question the effective decision-maker 
asks: 'Is a decision really necessary?' One alternative is 
always the alternative of doing nothing" (p. 475). If it is 
2
found after research that the issue will resolve itself, 
then Drucker (1985) advised that "one does not interfere. 
Nor does one interfere if the condition, while annoying, is 
of no importance and unlikely to make much difference. It 
is a rare executive who understands this" (p. 475). Nutt 
(2002) found that "people spend little time thinking about 
how to make a decision" (p. 4) .
Background and Context of Decision Making
Luecke (2006) said that "the basic purpose of making 
decisions is to achieve a meaningful objective" (p. 4). 
Whether the objective is to gradually improve a process 
with total quality management (TQM) or to overhaul a 
process through reengineering, decisions should undergo a
I
thorough examination.to ensure the best quality of outcome. 
Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie (1999) stated a basic 
premise that "all strategy begins with some form of
I
situation analysis—that is, a picture of what the world 
will look like today,and what it is likely to happen in the 
future" (p. 12) .
Pundits will debate about their visions of the future 
from their vantage point and write books full of analysis 
of the current state of affairs and future projections, but 
GIS can portray these concepts pictorially much better than 
3
words or graphs. The decision process has been analyzed by 
many authors, and it can be divided into three main models: 
rational, organizational process, and political. The 
organizational m'odel was not chosen because it prevents 
decision makers "from forecasting the future and acting on 
the basis of a predetermined vision. Decision makers are 
forced to make incremental changes based on standard 
operating procedures" (Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta 
2002, p. 131).
The political model was not chosen because it is 
problematic in that "it involves a number of actors with 
their own agendas, priorities, and timetables." Bargaining 
occurs between the parties and becomes "a collection of 
decisions that often is assembled more haphazardly than 
logically" (Denhardt.et al. 2002, pp. 132-133). To further 
complicate mattets, Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret 
(1976) found that "judgment seems to be the favored mode of 
selection . . ."'while the analytical approach was used the
least, (p. 258) Clark and Shrode (1979) supported this 
through their empirical studies and found that "the key 
variables used in problem definition were ethically rather 
than factually based" (p. 353). The rational model has 
distinct advantages in that decisions are orderly, 
4
purposeful, deliberate, consistent, responsible, 
accountable, explainable, and rational. (Denhardt et al., 
p. 129) Jankowski and Nyerges (2001) supported this 
approach because, "the benefit of a structured understanding 
of the decision procfess is that it lends itself to computer 
support, hence regularity" (p. 14).
Views of the Decision Process
I
Murray (1986) separated the decision process into 
three phases: the analytical phase where situations are 
perceived and information is gathered; the design phase
i
where alternatives are generated; and the choice phase 
where alternatives are evaluated and selected, (p. 10) The 
decision process,follows a rational approach as described 
by Murray that includes a "discrete procedure that leads to 
goal maximization" (p. 53). Matheson and Matheson (1998) 
described "a logically correct reasoning process" as one 
that ". . . considers alternatives, information, risks, and
values in the context of the decision frame, and reaches a 
conclusion based'on the evidence" (p. 54). Nutt's (2002)
I
research resulted in a five-stage approach that would 
attempt to prevent major problems from occurring:
. . . collect information to understand the
claims calling for action, establish a direction 
5
that indicates the desired result, mount a 
systematic search for ideas, evaluate these ideas 
with the direction in mind, and manage social and 
political barriers that can block the preferred 
course, of action during implementation, (pp. 41- 
42)
These authors have taken a more discrete approach to the 
process steps than others.
Heirs (1987) followed an iterative approach with the 
manager focused equally on all stages from question 
formulation to alternative creation to consequence
i
implication to decision and back through again if no valid 
alternative was found. "The four stages cannot, therefore, 
be thought of as,a set of stepping stones leading directly 
from the beginning of the decision-thinking process to its 
completion" (Heirs, pp. 31-34). Harrison (1981) tended to 
agree and stated that "it is apparent that the decision­
making process is both interrelated and dynamic" (p. 27). 
Is it would seem that McCall and Kaplan (1990) combined 
Peters' (1987) advice to "do it all at once" (p. 46) with 
the process presented by other authors, which said that 
decision making follows a logical progression from question 
6
formulation to decision, and instead intertwined the 
stages:
I
Discovering what exactly the problem is all about 
is conjoined with the identification of 
alternatives and their evaluation. Often a choice
I
is made quite early in the process, with 
subsequent: activity devoted to confirming the 
early choice, (p. 7)
Nutt (2002) warned though that this tendency to ". . . jump
on the first idea that comes along and then spend years 
trying to make it work. . . . is a key cause of failure,
which decision makers fail to see that they.fail to see" 
(p. 5) .
McCall and Kapian (1990) may have drawn upon Witte's 
work but did not explicitly state so. Witte (1972) 
empirically investigated the decision process and found 
that "decisions appear as the result of a gestation 
process" and "reject[ed] the concept that decisions are the 
result of a choice at a point in time" (pp. 156-157). 
Although Witte found that most activity occurs in the 
latter part of the process, he concluded that:
Information-gathering, alternative-developing, 
and alternative-evaluating operations ... do 
7
not culminate in distinct phases in time, but 
rather are distributed over the total duration of 
the process, (p. 177)
I
As an empirical approach, Witte dealt with the realities of 
the situations as presented to him whether or not the 
observed parties were using best decision making practices.
The time fo'r marking a decision should be judiciously 
used. De Geus (1999), researched organizational learning and 
found that decision processes can take "too much time when 
the ability to learn faster than the competitors is the 
only real advantage"' (p. 51) . De Geus defines learning as
I
"hearing a new signal, digesting it, confirming it, [and]
I I
acting on it . . (p. 51). De Geus found that the typical
time for this learning process is between 12 to 18 months.
(p. 56) Nutt (2002) researched decisions and found three 
common process mistakes "in all debacles:1 rushing to 
judgment, misusing resources, and applying failure-prone 
tactics" (p. x) . Nutt found seven "traps" that managers can 
make if they follow these process mistakes (See Appendix 
A); Appendix B contains practices that avoid these traps.
1 Nutt defines a debacle as "a decision riddled with poor practices 
producing big losses that became public" (p. ix).
8
De Geus (19j99) 'Stated that "in fact, the normal 
decision process in corporations is a learning process, 
because people change their own mental models and build up 
a joint model as they talk" (p. 54). Tan et al. (2006) 
stated that "the goal of [data] visualization is the 
interpretation of the visualized information by a person 
and the formation of a mental model of the information" (p. 
105). De Geus stated the following about learning and 
mental models: ,
The only relevant learning in a company is the 
learning done by those people who have the power 
to act. ... So the real purpose of effective 
planning is not to make plans but to change the 
microcosm, the mental models that these decision 
makers carry in their heads, (p. 56)
These mental models whether practical or visionary affect 
the way decisions are processed and are themselves affected 
by data availability, values, and perceptions. Nutt (2002) 
presented a way to reduce time for the learning process 
while not advocating a rush to judgment. Nutt found that 
"learning demands a culture in which decisions can be 
discussed without [a] blame-finding mentality" (p. 39). If 
this culture does not exist, then learning will be delayed 
9
because Nutt found that "... people seldom own up to 
failures and delay the day of atonement as long as
II
possible" (p. 3 8i) .
Values and their Impact
Jacob, Flink, and Schuchman (1962) found values for 
decision making to be important because:
Values arise in response to the necessity in all 
human behavior for the exercise of choice among 
mutually exclusive alternatives of action. Values 
have the property of selectivity, that is, the 
quality of ordering the options available in 
terms which those who have to make the choices 
will accept as decisive, (p. 15)
Harrison (1981) found that "the personal values of the 
decision maker and the values of the organization 
significantly influence the entire process of decision 
making" (p. 151)'. With the organization's values setting 
the managerial objectives, the decision maker's personal 
values will influence the search activity and the 
comparison and evaluation of alternatives, but the 
organization's values will usually supersede when the 
implementation occurs. (Harrison 1981, p. 151)
10
Decisions are rarely made in a vacuum free of values
1
I
and their impact;. Simon (1976) stated that "in practice, 
the separation between the ethical and factual elements in 
judgment can usually be carried only a short distance" (p. 
52). The goals and drives of a company or agency are driven 
by profit, service, or other mission activities. Wiederhold 
(1999) warned that:
(
Combining information from multiple sources . . .
increases the risk of violation of individual and 
commercial privacy. Issues of privacy protection 
and security must be addressed if broad access to 
valuable data is to become commonplace, (p. 11)
Murray (1986) said that "rational models posit the absurd
I
assumption that the end or the goal (value-laded concept) 
can be achieved by a series of neutral (value-free) choices 
or steps" (p. 16). While this may be true, neutral choices 
help to maintain some form of objectivity while the manager 
attempts to control the other forces impacting the 
decision. If managers allow stereotypes to impact their
I
evaluation of the facts then Harrison (1981) found that
"perceptual defense" will cause managers to perceive 
inaccurately, (pp. 210-211)
11
Knight (1964) took a different route and said that "we 
perceive the world before we react to it, and we react not 
to what we perceive, but always to what we infer" (p. 201). 
Haney (1986) built upon this thought in his discussion of 
inference-observation confusion where he found it occurs 
when:
(1) Someone makes an inference, (2) fails to 
recognize or remember that he or she has done so,
(3) thus does not calculate the risk involved,
(4) proceeds to act upon the assumption as if it
I
were certain, and (5) end by taking an
i'
unrecognized and uncalculated risk that may prove 
costly, dangerous, or even fatal, (p. 219)
Leaving aside the physiological reasons for the confusion, 
such as fatigue, , Haney listed other contributing "... 
psychological factors, including emotion and stress, habit 
and set, values and needs, and group and social influences. 
In a category by;itself was a seldom suspected agent:2 our 
2 For a study of language related issues, Haney's book is recommended 
and was the required text for the COM 321 class in Communication 
Problem Analysis at ^California State Polytechnic University, Pomona in 
1986.
12
language!" (p. 221). During the decision process, summaries 
or displays of developing ideas can help to minimize errors 
in perception.
Murray (1986) discussed rational choice models and 
relayed:
Rational choice models do not preclude conflict 
resolution and resultant collective choice 
objectives. Nor do rational model theories ignore
Ithe prerequisite realities of value conflict, 
irreconcilable differences, and 
intraorganizational disputes, (p. 16)
This is one area'where communications can have a large 
effect. Murray advised about the context of decisions:
. . . because decisions are segmented and
discontinuous, and because objectives develop and 
change over time, behavior and decisions must be 
viewed in the context in which people, problems, 
and solutions come together, (p. 31)
In setting up the arena in which the decision takes place, 
Murray described systems theory as coming from the 
scientific method of causal analysis where artificially 
bounded regions could be managed and analyzed, (p. 83)
13
There must be a way to apply limits to rational thinking 
without limiting the generation of alternatives.
Issues Related to the Speed of the Decision
McCall and Kaplan (1990) wrote of the advantages of 
quick action regarding decisions, but these should be 
limited to prepared responses to crisis situations or their 
early warning signals, (pp. 69-71) March and Simon (1958) 
stated this more succinctly in their discussion of 
responses to stimuli:
At one extreme, a stimulus evokes a response— 
sometimes very elaborate—that has been developed 
and learned at some previous time as an 
appropriate response for a stimulus of this 
class. This is the "routinized" end of the 
continuum, where a stimulus calls forth a 
performance program almost instantaneously, (p. 
139)
McCall and Kaplan found another situation where quick 
action would not be thought of as a panic reaction; "... 
managers can get information quickly if they know their 
people well enough and if they have an operational network 
of contacts . . (p. 71).
14
Outside of these situations, the advantages McCall and 
Kaplan (1990) expounded over a strategy-based analysis 
would lead to poor decisions. The advantages do not require 
much thought or understanding from the manager, and this 
could lead to solving the wrong problem. The advantages 
only serve as a communication tool in that "they give 
visible evidence that attention is being given to the 
problem" and that other personnel could participate if they 
so choose, (p. 69) The vividness of the information can 
produce biases where Nutt (2002) warned that "experiences 
with a powerful impact evoke images that influence how we 
see ourselves and others. Well-reasoned arguments are swept 
away by the vivid concern" (p. 79). When data are combined 
with values and organized to be information, it should be 
tempered to be more useful and not reactionary.
Decision Description
Now that the basic elements impacting the decision­
making process have been introduced, the core of the 
process will be explored. This will provide the framework 
for the work that follows. Drucker (1967) found that 
strategic decisions were not "adaptations to the apparent 
needs of the moment" but problems dealt with "at the 
highest conceptual level of understanding. [The managers he 
15
studied] tried to think through what the decision was all 
about, and then tried to develop a principle for dealing 
with it" (p. 121). Drucker (1967) outlined the elements of 
the effective strategic decision as:
1. The clear realization that the problem was 
generic and could only be solved through a 
decision which established a rule, a principle;
2 . The definition of the specifications which the 
answer to the problem had to satisfy, that is, 
of the "boundary conditions";
3. The thinking through what is "right," that is, 
the solution which will fully satisfy the 
specifications before attention is given to the 
compromises, adaptations, and concessions 
needed to make the decision acceptable;
4. The building into the decision of the action to 
carry it out;
5. The "feedback" which tests the validity and 
effectiveness of the decision against the 
actual course of events, (pp. 122-123)
Problem Identification. Drucker (1967) broke down the 
first element into four occurrences. "There is first the 
truly generic of which the individual occurrence is only a 
16
symptom" (p. 123). Harrison (1981) agreed that "if, for 
example, a particular type of decision tended to recur 
often, there would be no need to repeatedly search for 
alternatives. Most likely, a policy or procedure would be 
established to handle such decisions" (p. 27). Drucker 
(1967) continued to the next occurrence stating:
Then there is the problem which, while a unique 
event for the individual institution, is actually 
generic. . . . Next, there is the truly
exceptional, the truly unique event. . . . [The
fourth is] the early manifestation of a new 
generic problem, (p. 124)
Harrison found many organizations where generic decisions 
having highly programmed outcomes were treated "as if they 
were unique, in the name of participative management. . . .
this represents a tremendous waste of human resources" (p. 
14). Nutt's (2002) first-stage claim parallels Drucker's 
first element where Nutt stated "claims identify the 'arena 
of action' or topic the decision maker expects to address, 
and . . .is derived from a need or opportunity
stakeholders believe to be important" (p. 42). Through 
17
claim reconciliation, Nutt found that "the concerns and 
considerations uncovered provide you with new ways to think 
about the arena of action" (p. 47).
Boundary Conditions. The second element should be 
researched and understood as fully as possible. Drucker 
(1967) found that "the more concisely and clearly boundary 
conditions are stated, the greater the likelihood that 
decision will indeed be an effective one and will 
accomplish what it set out to do" (p. 130). Nutt's (2002) 
second stage suggested doing this by "identify[ing] a need 
embedded in the claim and offer a problem or an objective. 
. . . [then] the decision maker examines the reasons for
action and decides what results are required" (p. 43). Nutt 
warned not to use "a ready-made idea found in the claim" 
because that would limit the search for options, which in 
turn would limit the chances of finding a superior 
solution, (p. 43) Before the third element of rightness can 
be argued, the boundary conditions should be set, but 
Drucker (1967) found that "it is not always easy to find 
the appropriate boundary conditions. And intelligent people 
do not necessarily agree on the them" (p. 131). This is an 
area where failure-prone practices can have a substantial 
negative impact. Nutt found a way to correct this by 
18
telling people what is wanted as a result, such as lower 
cost. This will produce better results than seeking the 
cause of the cost increase by liberating employees to look 
for answers and by avoiding the specter of blame, (pp. 4-5)
Compromises. The first two elements must be understood 
before proceeding on to the third element because 
compromises occur. Drucker (1967) found that ". . .if one
does not know what is right to satisfy the specifications 
and boundary conditions, one cannot distinguish between the 
right compromise and the wrong compromise—and will end up 
by making the wrong compromise" (p. 134). Drucker (1967) 
continued later to state that "it is fruitless and a waste 
of time . . . starting out with the question 'what is
acceptable?' because [one] losses any chance to come up 
with an effective, let alone the right, answer" (p. 136). 
Nutt (2002) agreed and found that:
The decision maker who elects to choose among the 
claims and claimants moves into an idea­
imposition process. Decision makers who take 
steps to expand the pool of claims before 
selecting one begin a discovery process, (p. 43) 
Nutt found that "an idea-imposition process is linked to 
failed decisions and decision debacles" whereas "a 
19
discovery process [offers] a 'think first' approach that 
increases that chance of being successful" (p. 45).
Although the discovery process is the best process to 
pursue, Nutt warned that "a shift in tactics can occur in 
any process stage and lure an unsuspecting decision maker 
into the idea-imposition process, as shown in [Attachment 
C] . . ." with the false hope that the revised tactics will
be cheaper and faster, (p. 53) The fourth and fifth 
elements are included next to round out the discussion of 
the decision-making process.
Implementation. The forth element requires changes in 
workflow. Drucker (1967) stated that "in fact, no decision 
has been made unless carrying it out in specific steps has 
become someone's work assignment and responsibility. Until 
then, there are only good intensions" (p. 136). When 
changes need to be made to people's:
. . . behavior, habits, or attitudes [for] a
decision to become effective action . . . one has
to make sure that [those people's] measurements, 
their standards for accomplishment, and their 
incentives are changed’ simultaneously. Otherwise, 
the people will get caught in a paralyzing 
internal emotional conflict, (p. 138)
20
Nutt's (2002) last stage concentrated on two ways to 
implement the decision: stakeholder involvement in the 
decision, or persuasion and edict. The former focuses on 
inclusion where the implementation can start to be built in 
and where social and political issues can be addressed, and 
the latter focuses on compliance where the implementation 
is delayed until the end of the process, (p. 44)
Nutt defined persuasion as calling "on a decision 
maker to collect arguments that support a preferred course 
of action and to garner the endorsements of experts, and 
then combine them with salesmanship" (p. 98). Nutt defined 
an edict as a prescription of necessary behavior, (p. 44) 
"This is done without consulting with people who have a 
stake in the changes the decision would bring" (Nutt, p. 
99). Both of these compliance methods, persuasion and 
edict, will have negative consequences if used often. Nutt 
found that "after a power play, people will only tell you 
what they think you want to hear and will no longer tell 
you what they believe to be true" (p. 52).
Feedback. The fifth element requires feedback. In the 
1960's, computers were not as sophisticated as they are 
today and were looked upon with skepticism as reporting 
tools. Drucker (1967) stated that "all a computer can 
21
handle are abstractions. And abstractions can be relied on 
only if they are constantly checked against the concrete. 
Otherwise they are certain to mislead us" (p. 142). Drucker 
(1967). recommended to check underlying assumptions:
To go out and look for oneself is also the best,
if not the only, way to test whether the 
assumptions on which a decision had been made are 
still valid or whether they are becoming obsolete 
and need to be thought through again, (p. 142) 
While this is still prudent advice, information technology 
can increasingly relay more of the world in which 
operations occur'. To check those assumptions, GIS can dig 
into internal data marts, data warehouses, and external 
sources of data to concretely display past, current, and 
projected conditions.
22
CHAPTER TWO
CONTEXT FOR SUCCESS
Preparation
The proper setting for making decisions is as 
important to managers as the proper setting for learning is 
to students. Creating an environment and structure where 
decision team members feel comfortable contributing to the 
process and evaluating the alternatives will go a long way 
towards generating a quality solution. Whether the type of 
decision making is routine, creative, or negotiated, the 
manager should structure the decision group so that these 
"processes become congruent with changes in the nature of 
the decision-making tasks being undertaken . . (Delbecq
1967, p. 329). Movement through both the task and social 
dimensions of small-group communication should progress in 
an orderly manner. The basic tasks are 
instruction/definitions, division of labor, issue 
exploration/research, criteria setting, assessment, and 
conclusions/recommendations. The basic interpersonal 
elements are introductions, self disclosure, empathy, 
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display of open/closed attributes, development of 
role/status, and cohesiveness. (Kell and Corts 1980, pp. 8- 
9)
The manager should set the tone and insist that group 
interactions be professional. The people involved should 
not bicker or engage in non-productive argument. Luecke 
(2006) suggested that managers need to eliminate this 
activity and elevate the discussion of differences of 
opinion to a healthy level, (p. 6) Luecke gave the 
following examples of where executives or leaders would 
need to promote this level: in government where self- 
interest, rivalry, and alliances are dominant; in 
manufacturing where information can be contrary to 
established practices; and in research and development 
where rivalries and power struggles do not promote 
openness, (p. 12) Heirs (1987) said "the trick of fostering 
the sort of team spirit that leads to really inspired 
thinking is not easily defined; some managers do it almost 
instinctively, others find it extremely difficult" (p. 69).
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Involvement of a Decision Team
Division of Labor
More often than not, a decision maker will need 
assistance on large issues. Pounds (1969) found that 
methods, such as linear programming, were becoming 
available to assist managers to solve well-defined problems 
but likewise stated that managers "must also identify the 
problems to be solved" (p. 1). McCall and Kaplan (1990) 
suggested "that recognizing that problems exist is not an 
automatic part of the decision-making process" (p. 32). 
Witte (1972) stated that "complex decision processes 
involve a division of labor . . (p. 160). McCall and
Kaplan agreed and found that "this division of labor is 
necessary because many complex problems exceed the capacity 
of one or a few individuals to comprehend" (p. 18). Another 
reason for the division of labor is provided by Harrison 
(1981) who found that "the cognitive limitations of 
decision makers weigh against a detailed consideration of 
many alternatives that are too complex" (p. 41). On other 
fronts, Harrison found that "individual decision making is 
constrained by imperfect information, time and cost 
factors, frequently severe cognitive limitations, and 
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diverse psychological forces" (p. 6) . See Appendix D for a 
cross-section of the psychological factors Harrison 
discussed.
Vroom and Jago (1988) reviewed the work of Kurt Lewin 
and found "many [experiments] of which pointed to the 
efficacy of worker participation in decision making" (p. 
12). Vroom and Jago generally agreed with Witte and others 
and found that:
Contemporary managers, particularly in rapidly 
changing industries, can seldom possess all the 
knowledge necessary to make intelligent decisions 
by themselves.... Integration of information 
necessarily requires participation, (p. 99)
Vroom and Jago did make the caveat that "groups can, under 
some circumstances, outperform individuals" (p. 117).
Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) supported this discussion and 
relay "... two key findings from cognitive psychology 
relating to human judgment: (1) ability to process 
information is limited; and (2) people are adaptive" (p. 
116) .
As Upton (1998) found out, product life cycles and 
process life cycles have become shorter, and change is 
occurring more rapidly, (p. 1) Peters (1987) prescribed 45
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actions for managers to take during times of change. Peters 
went on to say, "The bad news: You can't do it all at once, 
but you must. Failure to get on with almost all of this 
agenda at a brisk pace and you're in for trouble" (p. 46). 
De Geus (1999) learned of a way to incorporate a couple of 
Peters' recommendations to accelerate institutional 
learning: changing the rules (operational processes or 
procedures) or suspending them. (pp. 57-58) Old rule 
boundaries may no longer be necessary, or if they were, a 
fresh understand of why they exist may surface. McCall and 
Kaplan (1990) suggested that the "ability to detect 
problems early not only helps in day-to-day decision making 
but can be essential in handling crises . . ." (p. 11).
This early detection is important because De Geus pointed 
out that once in a crisis .there is usually little time and 
few options available (p. 54). Nutt (2002) found though 
that "only one in ten decisions has significant urgency, 
and only one in a hundred can be called a crisis" (p. 142). 
De Geus concluded from a research of long-lived companies, 
that "the challenge [is], therefore, to recognize and react 
to environmental change before the pain of crises" and 
better yet "to institutionalize change" (p. 54).
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Group Dynamics
With the understanding that group involvement in the 
decision making is highly recommended, it is important to 
understand the group dynamics and issues that will lead to 
success or failure. Luecke (2006) advised that the correct 
people participate in the decision process, (p. 6) Heirs 
(1987) stated that "a manager has two fundamental tasks - 
to manage a decision-implementing team and a decision­
thinking team" (p. 12). The focus of Heirs' work was on the 
later. Luecke said that the people on the decision-thinking 
team should be "knowledgeable, have experience, and have a 
stake in the outcome" (p. 13). From their studies of upper 
level managers and their immediate subordinates from the 
United States and Europe in the 1970s, Heller and Wilpert 
(1981) advanced that:
Participative decision-making methods depend on 
the existence of skills among subordinates. 
Participation is also associated with higher job 
satisfaction, more positive attitudes to the 
company, and greater managerial success, (p. 6)
Vroom and Jago (1988) stated that participation 
provides leadership practice, and "the resulting 
development of decision-making capabilities increases the 
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reservoir of talents on which the organization can 
subsequently draw" as the participants work "through common 
problems [that could] lead to the mutual sharing of 
information, experience, and skills" as well as trust and 
reliance on one another, (p. 27) Nutt (2002) discussed 
different types of participation and found it useful for 
other reasons, such as managing interests, and he found 
that "participation has a good success record and is even 
timely, requiring much less time to carry out than either 
the edict or the persuasion tactic" (p. 107).
According to Luecke (2006) five types of people should 
be involved with the decision: people with authority to 
allocate resources; stakeholders who are directly affected 
by the decision; experts (internal or external) who can 
provide information about the feasibility of various 
options; opponents who can present a valid contrary 
position; and proponents of the position, (pp. 13-14) 
Luecke may have taken Heirs' suggestion when recommending 
the involvement of experts because Heirs (1987) offered 
that:
Involving people who have specialist information 
and experience at their fingertips in this way 
not only helps ensure the information will be 
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there, on tap, when it is needed; it also helps 
make certain that others, in their own 
deliberations, will take that information into 
account, (p. 52)
Extra people are needed because managers have a limit to 
what they can effectively and efficiently accomplish due to 
their work load.
A conscientious manager should not succumb to what 
McCall and Kaplan (1990) found as "a fact of managerial 
life" that of making "quick-action decision processes for 
disposing of complex problems" (p. 68). Luecke (2006) 
suggested first that chances are someone in the group may 
have the answer, but second and more important, "several 
individual group members may have partial solutions that, 
when combined, solve the entire problem" (p. 125). Harrison 
(1981) found that "it is also true that a group normally 
provides a broader range of knowledge and a variety of 
critical viewpoints that may yield a more penetrating 
analysis of a given problem" (p. 7).3
3 For a detailed discussion of the sociology of decision making see 
chapter 8 of Harrison (1981).
While advocating five types of people to be on the 
decision team, Luecke (2006) also suggested limiting the 
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size of the team to six or seven members, (p. 14) Vroom and 
Jago (1988) implied from Ivan Steiner's work:4
4 Steiner, I. (1972) Group process and productivity. Burlington, MA:
Academic Press
[The] model for expressing both positive and 
negative effects of increasing group size and for 
examining the cost-benefit tradeoff [imply that] 
. . . smaller groups are more likely to suffer
from not having the needed informational 
resources and larger ones from problems of 
coordination . . . . (p. 23)
Luecke said that if the complexity of the decision demands 
more assistance,, then task forces can be used to analyze 
parts of the problem, (p. 14) This is similar to Meredith 
and Mantel's (2003) breaking down a project into tasks and 
further into work packages, (p. 8) Work packages would be 
the individual assignments within the task force. Task 
force members would then organize their own work into what 
Meredith and Mantel called work units, (pp. 8-9) 
Approaches to Decision Making
To give a sense of ownership and responsibility to the 
team, Luecke (2006) outlined three decision-making 
approaches: consensus, qualified consensus where leader 
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will decide when no consensus is achieved, and majority.
(pp. 16-17) Drucker (1985) found that Japanese institutions 
attempt to achieve consensus throughout the organization 
before decisions are made because for them, "the important 
element in decision-making is defining the question. The 
important and crucial steps are to decide what whether 
there is a need for a decision and what the decision is 
about" (p. 467). Nutt (2002) always found debacles where:
Little time or money was spent rethinking the 
claim5 that specified the arena of action. To 
avoid this trap, decision makers must uncover and 
reconcile the concerns and considerations of the 
people whose support they need to be successful. 
(p. 29) ■
5 Nutt describes a claim as a call for action, (pp. 23-24)
This process allows the eventual implementation to be made 
quickly with littlechance for degradation of the decision 
due to resistance or operational adjustments because 
"everyone has been presold" (Drucker 1985, p. 468) .
Heller and Wilpert (1981) found that "in times of 
business turbulence and uncertainty, managers use more 
participative forms of management to get as many views as 
possible to chart a better course" (pp. 36-37) . As 
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turbulence and uncertainty increase, participation is 
curtailed and power becomes concentrated. At the extreme of 
this line of thinking is the crisis situation. Luecke 
(2006) outlined a fourth approach where directive 
leadership is used usually in times of crises, (p. 16) 
Heller and Wilpert found that "during these times, 
participation is limited as the manager takes a leadership 
role and dictates the course according to their judgment 
and training" (pp. 106-107). This could manifest into a 
management culture with negative effects.
Luecke warned that "command-and-control cultures tend 
to make decisions in line with the preferences of powerful 
individuals" (p. 6). This type of culture could result form 
various influences or could result from directive 
leadership not relinquishing control when a crises has 
passed. Simon (1976) related that during the time of his 
study, "administrators [had] increasingly recognized . . .
that authority ... is relatively impotent to control 
decision in any but a negative way" (p. 227). Nutt likewise 
found problems where "decision makers selected among the 
claims being offered according to their proponents' 
leverage and then forged ahead with this claim and its 
implied arena of action" (p. 25). In a much worse
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situation, Nutt warned that "edicts and persuasion fail 
because neither manages the social and political forces 
stirred up by a decision. . . . Involving potential critics
in the decision-making process clarifies their views . . ."
and garners their support, (p. 30)
The directive approach has drawbacks that can be 
minimized after the crisis has passed. As more people 
realize that the crisis has passed, they feel the need to 
participate in direction setting for the organization. 
Peters (1987), in the introduction to his section on 
people, gave this axiom as guidance to managers: "there are 
no limits to the ability to contribute on the part of a 
properly selected, well-trained, appropriately supported, 
and above all, committed person" (p. 342). McCall and 
Kaplan (1990) said that in forming the team "the 
negotiation over what is important begins early in the 
problem-solving process; involving the right people at the 
right times can create shared responsibilities and common 
perceptions" (p. 101). One of the multiple facets of the 
power of information that Peters shared, is that 
information motivates by providing "... critical 
confirmation that the firm see the worker as a partner and 
problem solver" (pp. 611-612).
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Pressures Impacting the Group
Heirs (1987) found that "successful decision-thinking 
is a product of individual minds working together ..." 
(p. 35). McCall and Kaplan (1990) warned that 
specialization as applied to complex problems ". . .is
notorious for leading to rivalries among specialists and a 
corresponding tendency to distort information to advance 
the interests of the specialty" (p. 18). Nutt (2002) 
advised that expected results should be known:
A direction that specifies expected results cuts 
the ground from under a defensive evaluation by 
making its self-serving intent evident, so 
decision makers in the debacles were careful to 
evaluate a preferred course of action without 
them. (p. 165)
Murray (1986) related that self interest models of 
decision making tend not to -be comprehensive and lead to 
choices that are less intelligent and not beneficial to the 
whole, (p. 122) Luecke (2006) suggested that managers 
should develop a process that ensures this does not happen 
by allowing open-minded inquiry to prevail over advocacy 
for a particular outcome, (p. 18) Luecke detailed the 
inquiry approach as follows:
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An open process in which individuals ask probing 
questions, explore different points of view, and 
identify a wide range of options, with the goal 
of reaching a decision that the group creates and 
owns collectively.. In an inquiry approach, 
individuals set aside their personal opinions or 
preferences in order to arrive at a rational 
decision that is best for the group or 
organization. They do not advocate on behalf of 
their pet projects, (p. 19)
While this inquiry approach is the ideal, it is seldom 
realized, and Luecke suggested using a hybrid of the two 
approaches, (p. 21)
Heller and Wilpert (1981) surveyed upper management as 
to their methods of influence and power sharing and found 
that "prior consultation and joint decision-making were the 
most prevalent accounting for about sixty percent of 
occurrences for all types of decisions" (pp. 26-27). McCall 
and Kaplan (1990) found that "on vague and complex issues . 
. . managers interactively anchor their sense of reality.
They validate their perceptions, opinions, and conclusions 
in conjunction with the people around them" (p. 30). Heller 
and Wilpert also found that "when the upper managers were
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surveyed if they brought their peers into the decision­
making process, the results showed that they did not share 
power instead reserving the right to make the decision just 
under 60%" (p. 30). This left the group in an advisory
capacity a majority of the time.
Vroom and Jago (1988) took the original decision­
making model developed in 1973 by Vroom and Yetton6 based on 
situational theories of participation and improved it in 
terms of relative effectiveness. Vroom and Jago recognized 
that the earlier model had several shortcomings, (p. 83) 
They "acknowledge[d] that having sound thinking and a 
committed group to implement the decision is often not all 
that is needed to produce effective decisions. Decisions 
must also be made in a timely manner" (p. 108). McCall and 
Kaplan (1990) found that "it is someone's perception of the 
degree of urgency that affects the kind of action that will 
be applied to a problem" (p. 62). This affects the entire 
decision process from the frame of the problem to what 
alternatives are generated, the depth of their evaluation, 
and the method of their selection. Nutt (2002) warned of 
how time pressure can cause premature commitments and a
6 Vroom, V. H., & Yetton, P. W. (1973). Leadership and decision-making. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
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rush to judgment in order to meet one's responsibilities. 
"This push from fear (of failure) and the pull toward a 
reward make it difficult for a decision maker to step into 
the unknown and to remain there until insight emerges. 
These urges mount as time pressure increases" (p. 5). 
Likewise, Nutt warned that "decision makers . . . who acted
quickly, whether faced with a self-imposed or real 
deadline, were drawn toward using an edict" (p. 102). With 
this backdrop of group composition, interaction, and 
issues, the decision-making process can now unfold.
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CHAPTER THREE
FRAME THE ISSUE PROPERLY
Introduction
Ehninger (1974) stated that "beliefs that grow out of 
arguments . . . because they are attuned to facts, [change]
as the facts change" (p. 6) . Harrison (1981) studied 
perception in decision making and found that "the greater 
the contact with the facts and the more information 
available, the more likely it is that a perception will be 
sharp and defined" (p. 202). If one is steadfast to keep 
their mind on the pulse of what they know, then this would 
be true, but often times opinions continue after the facts 
have changed. Drucker (1967) found regarding the use of 
facts that:
Most books on decision-making tell the reader: 
"First find the facts." But executives who make 
effective decisions know that one does not start 
with facts. One starts with opinions. These are, 
of course, nothing but untested hypothesis and, 
as such, worthless unless tested against reality. 
To determine what is a fact requires first a 
decision on the criteria of relevance, especially 
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on appropriate measurement. This is the hinge of 
the effective decision, and usually its most 
controversial point, (p. 143)
Drucker (1967) found that "effective executives therefore 
insist on alternatives of measurement—so that they can 
choose the one appropriate one" (p. 147).
Luecke (2006) said, "Every successful decision depends 
on a clear understanding of the issues at hand and the ways 
each will affect the objectives of the business. It is 
critical to determine the nature of the problem" (p. 6). 
Upton found that where flexibility-improvement efforts were 
deemed by managers to be unsuccessful, key factors were not 
explored:
In the vast majority of those cases, the cause 
could be traced to a failure to identify 
precisely what kind of manufacturing flexibility7 
was needed, how to measure it, or which factors 
most affected it. (p. 133)
7 Upton describes flexibility as being "about increasing range, 
increasing mobility, or achieving uniform performance across a 
specified range" (p. 132).
Pounds (1969) empirically studied managerial problem 
finding and found that:
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The word "problem" is associated with the 
difference between some existing situation and 
some desired situation. . . . Since operator8
8 Pounds (1969) refers to operators as elements of managerial activity. 
"An operator transforms a set of input variables into a set of out 
variables according to some predetermined plan" (e.g., "lay out a 
production schedule") (p. 5).
selection is triggered by the difference to be 
reduced, the process of problem finding is the 
process of defining differences. Problem solving 
. . . is the process of selecting operators which
will reduce differences, (p. 5)
Borrowing from Pounds, McCall and Kaplan (1990) offered 
three standards for identifying discrepancies in current 
operations: the past, the future or forecasts, and the 
benchmarks of other operations - internal or external, (pp. 
12-13) Pounds concluded his study by stating, "It seems 
clear, however, that we must understand the process by 
which differences are defined before we can worry about 
understanding the process of selecting from among them" (p. 
18). Drucker (1967) found that "the effective decision­
maker, therefore, organizes disagreement. ... He starts 
out with the commitment to find out why people disagree" 
(p. 153).
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Scope of the Frame
Conceptualization
Framing an issue (big picture) starts with opinions, 
supported or not by facts, that lead to problem 
recognition. That then leads to the analysis of why or what 
issues are at play to cause the difference between the 
desired and current state of affairs. This is all 
understood in the context of a frame developed with 
analytical and psychological underpinnings. Matheson and 
Matheson (1998) stated that "unless we make a deliberate 
effort to do otherwise, we frame problems in terms of our 
beliefs and prejudices, predisposing ourselves to see these 
problems in certain ways, reality notwithstanding" (p. 35).
Expanding on this idea, Luecke (2006) stated that 
"beginning with an inappropriate or erroneous frame can 
lead you to an ineffective conclusion. Alternatively, you 
may successfully solve the wrong problem - or solve it in 
the wrong way" (p. 25). Williams (2007) found that framing 
". . . may cause the individual to consider a narrow range
of concepts/issues, which could lead to inappropriate 
decisions, as a complete assessment of the situation has 
not occurred" (p. 15). Nutt (2002) also found issues with 
the framing process when "the anticipated benefit of the
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idea becomes the direction. . Decision makers who
become fixated on an idea fail to ask 'refraining' 
questions. . . . Commitment to the idea becomes a trap,
which often leads to failure" (p. 117).
Even if the frame is properly envisioned, it needs to 
be defined carefully. Haney (1986) warned that a situation 
he labeled as blindering could occur where:
The words we use to define a problem or situation 
can act as blinders . . . and thus restrict us in
our approach to the problem or situation. . . .
Blindering may (1) delay or impede desirable 
solutions and (2) lead to undesirable solutions, 
(pp. 489-491)
Drucker (1967) warned to not start with facts:
People inevitably start out with an opinion; to 
ask them to search for facts first is even 
undesirable. They will simply do what everyone is 
far too prone to do anyhow: look for the facts 
that fit the conclusion they have already 
reached, (p. 144)
Drucker (1954) found that "the most common source of 
mistakes in management decisions is the emphasis on finding 
the right answer rather than the right question" (p. 351).
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This may occur because management is assuming that they are 
already on the correct course and just need some answers to 
adjust their heading.
McCall and Kaplan (1990) found that "there are things
[managers] do that have profound effects on how they gather 
information, process it, and put it together to 'define' 
the problems they face" (p. 33). These things are digging, 
which involves listening and asking questions, and knowing 
the business, which involves thoroughly knowing the people 
the manager works with and the business they are in; these 
are two of the keys to finding problems. (McCall and 
Kaplan, pp. 33-35) Nutt (2002) offered the discovery 
process as one that would lead to better success than the 
idea-imposition process. "The discovery process begins with 
the decision maker polling a diverse group of stakeholders 
[similar to digging] to uncover their concerns and 
considerations" (p. 53). If a move is made away from the 
discovery process, Nutt's research found that decision 
makers were unable to return to it. (p. 55) Managers must 
increase their competency for listening9 and communication.
9 For an often neglected study on listening, refer to Nichols, R. G., & 
Stevens, L. A. (1957). Are you listening? New York: McGraw Hill.
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Issues with the Lack of Critical Thinking
Simon (1976) stated that one of the limits to 
rationality as viewed by the individual is their values and 
conceptions of purpose, (p. -241) Heirs (1987) found that 
"there is a prejudice, shared by many people, in favor of 
simple questions. This prejudice unfortunately leads to 
poor thinking . . (p. 41). Hoos (1972) warned when using
systems analysis of:
. . . a chain reaction of poor conceptualization,
gathering of data more because they are available 
than indicative, and dependence on factors only 
because they are can be counted in the ongoing 
analysis and not because they are known to be 
important in the final analysis, (p. 8)
McCall and Kaplan (1990) found that "there is clearly, 
then, a continuum of problems that lands on a manager's 
desk, from the virtually prepackaged to the completely ill- 
defined" (p. 13). The prejudice Heirs found may have been 
the result of too many prepackaged problems coming to 
managers.
In their desire to dispatch with the workload and make 
themselves feel or look as though they are accomplishing 
something, the more complex issues remain, which may cause
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the business to be vulnerable to any of five forces 
discussed by Michael Porter.10 Peng (2006) relayed these 
five forces as "(1) the intensity of rivalry among 
competitors, (2) the threat of potential entry, (3) the 
bargaining power of suppliers, (4) the bargaining power of 
buyers, and (5) the threat of substitutes" (p. 41). While 
it is obvious to most students of business, Matheson and 
Matheson (1998) advised to "frame strategic and operational 
problems differently" (p. 38). Drucker (1954) found that 
tactical decisions are made "to find the most economical 
adaptation of known resources" whereas strategic managerial 
decisions ". . . involve either finding out what the
10 Porter, M. (1980). Competitive strategy. New York: Free Press.
situation is, or changing it, either finding out what the 
resources are or what they should be"' (p. 352).
Manipulation. Framing the decision correctly is half 
the battle. If managers know how to frame issues and can 
get those issues framed according to their agenda, Luecke 
(2006) found that "they have a greater chance of producing 
the decision their favor" (p. 26). Drucker (1967) cautioned 
managers to understand the issues because "most people 
start out with the certainty that what they see is the only 
way to see at all" (p. 154). McCall and Kaplan (1990) found 
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that "problem recognition may be a contest between 
competing points of view backed up by different degrees of 
power, and managers sometimes manipulate the context to 
achieve political ends—even to the extent of keeping 
secrets and practicing deception" (p.31). Peters (1987) 
stated that "it is the philosophy of control that must be 
illuminated as a major force in decision making [because] 
control, and not technology, emerges as the key referent 
for analysis of decision making" (p. 223). Technology, now 
twenty years later, has a much greater capability to 
identify and display issues to assist with framing the 
decision.
Ethics. Murray (1986) said though that "just as the 
individual decision maker maximizes his goal seeking 
behavior, so, too, the organization seeks to maximize its 
goals" (p.53). Whether the decision maker accepts the 
ethics of the organization or advances their own ethics, 
Nutt (2002) found that values and ethics play a subtle role 
in decision making:
Tough decisions pose ethical dilemmas. Ignoring 
these dilemmas sets a trap that ensnared decision 
makers in the debacles. . . . Ethical issues crop
up . . . subtly through alternatives that are 
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never presented and criteria to judge an 
alternative that are selected because they favor 
a preferred course of action, (pp. 35-36)
Rokeach (1973) linked values to decisions and said that "a 
value system is a learned organization of principles and 
rules to help one choose between alternatives, resolve 
conflicts, and make decisions" (p. 14). Luecke (2006) 
suggested however that managers should be encouraged "to 
adopt a frame that benefits the organization" (p. 26). The 
reason for Luecke's suggestion may be that decision makers 
allow their personal value system to "influence the extent 
to which [they] will accept or will resist organizational 
pressures and goals" (England, 1967, p. 54). 
Experimentation
Frames. Matheson and Matheson (1998) found that 
"advocates often subconsciously select the frame most 
advantageous to their point of view" and advised, "Always 
question them" (p. 38). Luecke (2006) said one way to 
understand the problem is by trying different frames "and 
assessing if whether the available information supports 
your theories" (p. 30). Heirs (1987) pointed out this issue 
as one of two distinct hazards. Vital data needs to be 
obtained, beyond that which indicated the problem, before 
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acting "if [the problem] is to be solved in the right way." 
The other hazard considered ."more dangerous ... is the 
temptation to prolong the research phase indefinitely" (p. 
51). McCall and Kaplan (1990) found that "the importance of 
the problem to the organization often is not the 
determining factor in the time and effort consumed" (p. 5). 
Matheson and Matheson found that "some frames are more 
productive and appropriate than others. One good way to 
evaluate and improve the quality of the frame is to expose 
the problem to people with different points of view" (p.
38). Murray (1986) agreed in principle to use alternate 
frames because users of "rational models necessarily see 
the world as fixed in time and place, because to factor in 
the rational equation means to fix elements at some point 
in time" (p. 86).
Models. McCall and Kaplan (1990) advised that managers 
"should be aware that all models of how the world works are 
simplifications of reality and that different people may 
use different models to explain the same events" (p. 100). 
Harrison (1981) discussed the interdisciplinary aspects of 
decision making:
Ideally, then, a decision-making model should 
include some optimum number of variables that 
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will help explain the real-world, phenomenon being 
modeled. Such a model should help the decision 
maker predict real-world phenomenon with 
sufficient consistency and accuracy to be of 
considerable value, (p. 52)
De Geus (1999) agreed with McCall and Kaplan and stated 
"moreover, for the purpose of learning, it is not the 
reality that matters but the team's model of reality, which 
will change as members' understanding of their world 
improves" (p. 62). The model should be easily adjusted to 
allow for the presentation of ideas. De Geus found that 
"one characteristic of play ... is the presence of a 
transitional object. For the person playing, the 
transitional object is a representation of the real world" 
(p. 60) .
Computer Assistance. De Geus (1999) found that 
"computer models can be used to play back and forth 
management's view of its market, the environment, or the 
competition. The starting point, however, must be the 
mental model that the audience has at the moment" (p. 61). 
Murray (1986), seeing the impact of the personal computer 
on processes, stated that "an individual's seeming 
inability to transcend the physical limitations of time and 
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space is potentially altered by new technologies" (p. 222). 
Current technologies are making this potential realized 
through software of ever increasing capability. De Geus 
found three computer modeling applications to assist in the 
transcendence:
First, although the models in the human mind are 
complex, most people can deal with only three or 
four variables at a time and do so through only 
one or two time iterations. . . . Second, . . .
in working with dynamic models, people discover 
that in complex systems (like markets or 
companies) cause and effect are separated in time 
and place. . . . Lastly, ... we learn what
constitutes relevant information. For only when 
we start playing with these microworlds do we 
find out what information we really need to know, 
(pp. 62-63)
Questions. Heirs (1987) proposed that managers "... 
force themselves to consider whether or not they are asking 
their organization to answer the best questions" (p. 40). 
This would minimize the chance of the best answers not 
being available when action is required, and prevent the 
wasting of resources on the wrong issues, (p. 40) Usually
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thought of as an alternatives-generating process, Hoffman 
(1982) suggested "... that brainstorming can be used for 
defining the problem as well . . (p. 115). A systematic
approach could be to work through different rational models 
to arrive at a pattern to understand the larger processes 
in which the problem is embedded or a product thereof.
Symptoms. Basing solutions to problems on symptoms can 
be faulty and waste resources. Hill et al. (1979) found 
that "too often we address our remedies to what is merely a 
symptom, rather than to the underlying cause itself" (p. 
23). Strong minded managers seeking to cure one of their 
issues may choose this route, but as Luecke (2006) pointed 
out "in so doing they seek solutions before they understand 
the nature of the problem. . . . These solutions will
address the symptoms of the problem . . . but [they] may 
not address the root cause" (pp. 28-29) . Nutt (2002) 
concurred also and found that decision makers who attempt 
to quickly fix a problem frequently define it in a way ". .
. that proves to be misleading and misdirects people's 
energy. Symptoms are analyzed while important issues are 
ignored" (p. 119).
Causes. Murray (1986) stated that "unless a decision 
maker's world view rests on the tenet that problems result 
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from specific causes, very little can be done in a 
systematic way to conceptualize, much less to intersect, 
certain difficulties" (p. 218). To try to overcome the 
concentration on symptoms, decision makers need to think 
temporally and to place the symptoms in a larger context. 
That context will have more in common with the problem or 
root cause occurring over time than the symptom. Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1999) stated that "decision makers stumble 
into mental traps that yield bad decisions" because they 
fail to understand that "each decision is the outcome of a 
complex process that usually involves two different kinds 
of thinking: looking backward to understand the past and 
looking forward to predict the future" (pp. 132-133) . This 
process will generate many data elements or inputs for 
consideration. Matheson and Matheson (1998) found that the 
reasoning process's "objective is to organize and analyze 
inputs, sort through complexity, and scientifically 
understand which choice is likely to create greater value" 
(p. 54). The next section will now concentrate on the 
generation of alternatives that will lead to choice 
opportunities.
53
CHAPTER FOUR
GENERATE ALTERNATIVES
Introduction
Drucker (1985) stated that "unless one has considered 
alternatives, one has a closed mind" (p. 472). Nutt (2002) 
stated that "beginning with an answer sweeps away 
ambiguity. At first this is comforting, but it subsequently 
limits your ability to see attractive options" (p. 118). No 
major decision has a simple answer or one that can be 
relied upon for a number of years as being the right 
choice. Drucker (1954) stated that "predictions concerning 
five, ten or fifteen years ahead are always 'guesses'. . .
. an 'educated guess' ... is based upon a rational 
appraisal of the range of possibilities . . ." (pp. 88-89) .
Peters (1987) echoed this sentiment by stating two 
certainties: nothing is predictable, and no firm can take 
anything in its market for granted, (pp. 11-13)
The computer revolution changed everything during the 
decade of the 1980s, and that change continues unabated as 
technology progresses. Peters (1987) stated that 
"technology has changed the areas of financing, 
manufacturing, design, distribution, and product 
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definition" (p. 12). In essence, all of what Zikmund and 
D'Amico (1986) called the controllable marketing variables 
of price, product, place, and promotion have been affected, 
(p. 11) Murray (1986) said that rational thinking "is a new 
way of looking at the world and at ourselves" (p. 84). It 
is in this vein that new ideas must be generated.
Artificially Imposed Limitations
People usually make assumptions to limit the range of 
thought to objects or situations perceived to be true 
enough for the analysis undertaken. People may be defensive 
about their assumptions. Matheson and Matheson (1998) 
stated that "developing a full frame usually requires some 
cross-functional, assumption-challenging thinking" (p. 38). 
This may lead to conflict within the organization. In their 
study of organizations, March and Simon (1958) assumed 
"that where conflict is perceived, motivation to reduce 
conflict ... is generated ..." (p.115). Drucker (1967) 
found that ". . . disagreement alone can provide
alternatives to a decision. And a decision without an 
alternative [to fall back on] is a desperate gambler's 
throw, no matter how carefully thought through it might be" 
(p. 150). March and Simon found that the reaction to 
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conflict was "a tendency to evaluate a few alternatives 
thoroughly before searching for new ones" (p. 115).
Drucker (1967) provided the material for Luecke, and 
Matheson and Matheson when he stated that "whenever one has 
to judge, one must have alternatives among which one can 
choose. A judgment in which one can only say 'yes' or 'no' 
is no judgment at all" (p. 147). Eilon (1969) agreed and 
observed that "if the decision process produces only one 
alternative, there can obviously be no free choice 
exercised by the decision-maker, and therefore no decision" 
(p. B-178). Luecke (2006) likewise agreed and expanded this 
to state "in the absence of a realistic set of alternatives 
there can be no genuine decision" (p. 6). Matheson and 
Matheson (1998) found the following about choice and the 
operational culture:
The operational culture typically seeks a single 
viable choice [that] . . . puts top management in
the position of saying "yes" or "no" [thus 
relegating] . . . the executive role to one of
mere approval.... The fundamental error . . .
was that there were no alternatives, hence no 
basis for comparison or discussion. There was no 
real choice, (pp. 40-41)
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McCall and Kaplan (1990) supported this cultural statement 
and found that "managers often truncate information search 
and analysis" (pp. 67-68). Harrison (1981) found that 
"until the decision maker is driven to an expanded search 
activity, the search for alternatives is conducted as close 
to the familiar aspects of the managerial objectives as 
possible" (p. 95).
March and Simon (1958) found other reasons for not 
always striving for optimal alternatives:
Most human decision-making, whether individual or 
organizational, is concerned with the discovery 
and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only 
in exceptional cases is it concerned with the 
discovery and selection of optimal alternatives .
. . . To optimize requires processes several
orders of magnitude more complex than those 
required to satisfice, (pp. 140-141)
Harrison (1981) found that "clearly in complex and 
unstructured decision-making situations, the best that the 
rational decision makers can hope to obtain is a 
satisficing outcome" (p. 176). This does not mean that the 
analysis will be simplistic. Harrison (1981) found that 
judgment has its place as "an essential part of . . .
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decisions, where the cause-and-effeet relationships are 
uncertain and . . ." information is lacking. ... In this
case, "value judgments are very important in comparing and 
evaluating alternatives preparatory to choice. . . . the
decision-maker 'orders' alternatives according to how 
desirable they are within his or her system of values" (pp. 
175-176).
Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) found many sources of 
evidence indicating that "superficial information search 
and processing biases11 cause gross errors in human decision 
making" (p. 117). Nutt (2002) agreed and found that faulty 
claims can originate because "decision makers are prone to 
using information that is readily available, overlooking 
information that may be more diagnostic" (p. 77). When 
using information, decision makers have to keep track of 
when and how it was acquired, from whom, and in what form 
to name a few issues. Ehninger (1974) offered a factual way 
try to eliminate biases and stated that argument is a form 
of persuasive appeal, which lays out for the decision 
maker's "inspection and analysis the facts and reasons upon 
which the appeal is based" (p. 4).
11 The findings of Hogarth and Makridakis, originally appearing in their 
work as Exhibit 2 on pages 117 to 120, have been summarized by McCall 
and Kaplan (See Appendix G).
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While a formal evaluation should be postponed, 
Harrison (1981) stated that perception makes some informal 
evaluations:
Given the decision maker's need to scan the 
environment in search of relevant alternatives, 
it is obvious that the perceptual process 
significantly affects the decision-making 
process. In fact, the two processes are virtually 
inseparable, (p. 203)
Intertwined with these processes is the collection of 
information. Harrison found that "perception is ... a 
selective process.... The main factor in the selective 
process is attention" (p. 205). Managers have a busy 
agenda. Given the limited attention a manger can pay to 
various issues, they must limit the amount of information 
collected for decision making. (Harrison, p. 205) Nutt 
(2002) however warned that "this bias for action causes 
[managers] to limit their search, consider very few ideas, 
and pay too little attention to people who are affected, 
despite the fact that decisions fail for just those 
reasons" (p. 49).
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Removing the Limitations
Simon (1976) stated that "one of the limits to 
rationality as viewed by the individual is the extent of 
their knowledge and information" (p. 241). The creativity 
of music composers can be thought of as rational because of 
the schooling and training they received to frame their 
ideas from start through to a logical conclusion. Matheson 
and Matheson (1998) found that "in many cases, creativity 
involves nothing more than looking at a problem with fresh 
eyes, seeing in it something others missed, and refusing to 
accept the apparent solution. Creativity frames problems 
differently" (p. 41). The piano has 88 keys, but how many 
different works have been created by combining those keys 
dynamically in different patterns and tempos?
Luecke (2006), Callahan, Fleenor and Knudson (1986) , 
and Hoffman (1982) amongst others offered brainstorming as 
one method for generating alternatives. Callahan et al. 
(1986) stated that this alternative generation stage 
demands creativity, (p. 260) Heirs (1987) found that "a 
combination of both types [analytical and imaginative] of 
thinking is needed in the creation of any practical 
alternative" (pp. 64-65). Hill et al. (1979) stated that 
"it is important to write down all possible alternatives to 
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the problem solution, no matter how foolish or far-fetched 
they may seem at first" (p. 23). Nutt (2002) found that 
"several search initiatives are needed to uncover the 
required number of ideas before a quantum shift in 
understanding about what to do can occur" (p. 143). The 
evaluation phase should follow the generation phase. 
Hoffman stated "in this way no solution can acquire enough 
positive valence to pass the adoption threshold nor enough 
negative valence to drop below the rejection threshold 
before many alternatives have been proposed and described" 
(p. 115).
Luecke (2006) said that the merits of a variety of 
alternatives need to be weighed before the best decision 
can be made (p. 35). Matheson and Matheson (1998) warned 
however to "separate the creation of alternatives from 
their evaluation. Evaluating alternatives as they emerge 
tends to kill good ideas before they are fully conceived" 
(pp. 43-44) . Nutt (2002) found that quick results have 
their price:
In each debacle, decision makers embraced a quick 
fix. The first seemingly workable idea that was 
discovered got adopted. . . . [and] stops others
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from looking for ideas that could be better. . .
. and for an innovative one that provides 'first 
mover' advantage ... (pp. 33-34)
Matheson and Matheson had found that: 
alternatives should be
▲ broadly constructed, and not simply minor 
variations of a single concept;
▲ reasonable contenders for selection, not 
ridiculous extremes meant to make some other 
alternatives appear obviously superior; and
▲ sufficiently numerous to represent true choice, 
yet not so numerous as to confound the ability
. to evaluate and choose, (pp. 42-43)
Mintzberg et al. (1976) studied alternative selection 
and found that it "is typically a multistage, iterative 
process, involving progressively deeper investigation of 
alternatives" involving a pattern of "screen[ing], 
evaluation-choice, and authorization" (p. 257). Screening 
first reduces the list of alternatives to what is feasible; 
then those are evaluated, and a course of action is chosen; 
finally that choice is approved by the organization. 
(Mintzberg et al., p. 257)
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Other authors found that the generation and evaluation 
stages are comingled. Witte (1972) made the following 
statement at the conclusion of his empirical research: "We 
believe that human beings cannot gather information without 
in some way simultaneously developing alternatives. They 
cannot avoid evaluating these alternatives immediately, and 
in doing this they are forced to a decision" (p.180). 
Harrison (1981) follows this line of thought and found that 
"contrary to some opinions, the search for alternatives is 
parallel rather sequential. The decision maker considers 
several potentially acceptable alternatives at the same 
time" (p. 31). Mintzberg et al. (1976) also agreed with 
Witte and found "logic in delineating distinct phases of 
the strategic decision process, but not in postulating a 
simple sequential relationship between them" (p. 252). 
Empirically, Witte found out how people were making 
decisions. Researchers, such as Hill, Hoffman, and others, 
over the subsequent two decades developed tools that could 
improve the ways people made decisions.
Idea Generation
Managers usually bring groups together to assist with 
the decision-making process when issues are larger than an
63
individual can handle. Luecke (2006) and Callahan et al. 
(1986) said to consider the group's composition. Luecke 
offered that groups will "produce a creative friction that 
sparks new ideas, . . . safeguard against groupthink, . . .
and give good ideas more opportunity to develop" (p. 39). 
Normally the team offers ideas that someone will record; 
ideas can be generated remotely through teleconferencing. 
Callahan et al. warned the moderator or manager to guard 
against an expert dominating the discussion, (p. 261) 
Luecke likewise warned the moderator or manager to draw out 
the ideas of the shy participant, (p. 38) Some people 
prefer to communicate orally, and some to communicate 
through writing. The manager should get the ideas through 
the best means possible whether the group meets together or 
separately. Hartwick, Sheppard and Davis (1982) studied the 
acquisition, retainment, and recall of information and 
found that "information presented in group settings may be 
better retained for later use in decision making than that 
presented to group members separately . . ." (p. 9). Heirs
(1987) stated that all thoughts should be accepted for 
review:
The professional manager's aim must be to create 
an atmosphere in which people feel positively
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encouraged, to think out loud, and in which the 
thoughts they express are welcomed, respected and 
taken seriously even if some of them are badly 
articulated . . . (p. 68)
This is important because McCall and Kaplan (1990) found 
that "together rank and credibility make a great deal of 
difference in determining whether a person's view is 
accepted" (p. 31).
Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974) found that their Nominal 
Group Technique (NGT), which they developed in 1968, 
provided almost twice the quantity of ideas than did 
brainstorming and with greater satisfaction for the process 
by the participants, (p. 615) Hoffman (1982) reviewed the 
NGT and found two reasons for this; first "each member's 
perspective on the problem enters the group's problem­
solving efforts uncontaminated by others' points of view," 
and second "every member's idea has a chance to enter the 
group's deliberations without having to fight its way in" 
(p. 116). Hill (1982) found that statistical pooling, where 
the ". . . best ideas of several individuals who had worked 
separately" are summed, "was superior to group responses in 
number of unique ideas and in number of high-quality ideas 
. . ." (pp. 520-526) .
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Van de Ven and Delbecq (1974) compared NGT to Norman 
Dalkey's Delphi Technique and found that NGT produced a 
non-significant increase in the quantity of ideas (12%), 
but a significant increase in satisfaction for the process, 
(p. 615) Hoffman (1982) reviewed the Delphi Technique and 
found pertinent advantages and risks. He stated two 
advantages that "besides its obvious advantages for groups 
whose members are geographically distant, one of its 
principal objectives is to minimize the effects of status 
differences on the decision-making process" (p. 116). 
Ference (1970) noted this effect on the communications 
process and found that "if the recipient is a superior, 
there will be a tendency to make the information consistent 
with the transmitter's perception of what the recipient 
wants to hear" (p. B-85). The risks involved with the 
Delphi Technique are first "a lack of understanding of the 
problem and of the final decision" and second "the lack of 
members' commitment to the decision" due to the expected 
conformity to majority preferences, (p. 117) Whether the 
group works separately in the same room using the NGT or 
remotely in separate offices, ideas and alternatives must 
be generated as they are the root for choices.
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Einhorn and Hogarth (1999) stated that looking 
backward "involves looking for patterns, making links 
between seemingly unconnected events, testing possible 
chains of causation to explain an event, and finding a 
finding a metaphor or a theory to help in looking forward" 
(p. 132). Einhorn and Hogarth gave direction in finding 
causally relevant variables:
Four categories of cues [are]: temporal order 
(causes happen before effects), proximity (causes 
are generally close to effects in time and 
space), correlation (causes tend to vary along 
with effects), and similarity (causes may 
resemble effects through analogy and metaphor or 
in length and strength). (p. 136)
The next section will examine how the alternatives 
generated are evaluated and some of issues involved.
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CHAPTER FIVE
EVALUATE THE ALTERNATIVES
Introduction
Objectively, Murray (1986) stated two assumptions for 
the rational process of decision making. The first is "that 
the decision maker has a choice (or equally valid, that he 
thinks he has a choice)" (p. 54). It would make little 
sense to buy an expensive computer system for a process 
that will no longer be performed next year. The second is 
that intangible phenomena can be segregated and 
objectified, (p. 51) Nutt (2002) found some common sense 
matched up with "best practices [calling] for a comparison 
of competing ideas to select the one that come closest to 
providing the hoped-for results" (p. 58).
March and Simon (1958) summarized the existing 
decision theories into three categories:
a) Certainty: complete and accurate knowledge of 
the consequences that will follow on each 
alternative
b) Risk: accurate knowledge of a probability 
distribution of the consequences of each 
alternative
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c) Uncertainty: the consequences of each 
alternative are possible, but definite 
probabilities cannot be assigned to 
consequences, (p. 137)
Wilson and Alexis (1962) found that "certainty implies a 
state of awareness on the part of decision makers that 
seldom exists. Genuine uncertainty is almost as uncommon as 
complete certainty" (p. 154). These two ends of a spectrum 
of possible states of nature match closely to what occurs 
in statistical probability analysis beyond the third or 
fourth standard deviations (i.e., the occurrence is rare). 
The bulk of what a manager encounters in the middle 
somewhere hence the need for disciplined analysis. Nutt 
(2002) warned that "the urge to cut decision-making time 
and cost" can cause "subjective and judgmental tactics 
[that] are prone to error. Both place too much emphasis on 
intuition and too little on careful inference with good 
data" (pp. 170-173).
Luecke (2006) said to "assess the feasibility, as well 
as the risk and implications, of each possible choice" (p. 
6). Peters (1987) added that quality and flexibility are 
key to winning results, (p. 28) Upton (1998) found that 
companies were "increasingly concentrating on flexibility 
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as a way to achieve new forms of competitive advantage" 
because managers in a broad array of industries agree[d] 
that achieving low cost and -high quality [were] no longer 
enough to guarantee success" (p. 131).
Hill et al. (1979) suggested quantifying the 
alternatives "to rule out those that are not pertinent to
the problem solution" by means of "long- or short-range
plans and policies, costs, rewards, facilities . " (p.
24). Luecke the following variables to
consider:
Costs: actual, hidden, or savings over time
Benefits: quality, effectiveness, and customer 
satisfaction
• Financial impact: net income, timing, and need 
for borrowing money
• Intangibles: improved reputation, satisfied 
employees
• Time: implementation time, probability and 
impact of delays
• Feasibility: approach realism, obstacles, 
organizational resistance
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• Resources: personnel acquisition, training, 
impact on other projects
• Risk: profit, industry position, competitor 
response, information needs
• Ethics: legality, interest of stakeholders.
(pp. 47-48)
Luecke (2006) reflected the views of many that 
computers can help "to sort through the data, array them in 
useful ways, and1 do some number crunching" (p. 56). Nutt
(2002) found that:
Analytical . . . evaluation tactics have
excellent track records once a clear direction 
has been identified. . . . data are gathered from
archives, pilot tests, and simulations, and 
inferences are made from the data using 
analytical tools, (p. 167)
Hill et al. (1979) suggested that if precise information is 
available, decision aid tools, such as "decision matrix, 
linear programming, game theory, linear regression, 
mathematical modeling, and forecasting" should be used to 
arrive at a more objective decision, (p. 24) Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1999) warned that "in complex situations, we may
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rely too heavily on planning and forecasting and 
underestimate the importance of random factors in the 
environment. That reliance can . . . lead to delusions of
control" (p. 145). That is why Drucker (1954) warned that 
trend analysis should always be used with analysis of:
Events which are likely to have heavy impact upon 
future ['bedrock' underlying] economic conditions 
but which have already happened .... Where 
bedrock analysis tries to find the "why" of 
future events, trend analysis asks "how likely" 
and "how fast", (pp. 91-93)
As the decision process continues, Heirs (1987) warned 
that "no one, least of the manager, should assume at any 
point that all the necessary information has been 
accumulated. Facts which seemed irrelevant at first may 
well become critical later" causing a return to beginning 
". . .so that more information can be assembled and
distributed" (p. 53). Harrison (1981) also found that 
decision makers may have to do with limited data:
. . . whatever information is gathered during the
search activity is always incomplete or 
imperfect, and the number of alternatives is
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limited accordingly. More importantly, the cost 
of continually trying to perfect information 
rises exponentially, (p. 34)
This has an impact on uncertainty and risk. McCall and 
Kaplan (1990) found that "uncertainty also increases the 
number of criteria that are applied to the evaluation of 
alternative solutions, while risk increases the amount of 
analysis put into understanding the problem" (p. 63).
Uncertainty
Uncertainty should give anyone pause before continuing 
in their path or process and committing resources human or 
material because McCall and Kaplan (1990) found that 
"people (and mangers in particular) are inveterate seekers 
of information, and given some uncertainty, they will seek 
more information than is required" (p. 16). Harrison (1981) 
earlier found similar evidence that made it appear "that 
individuals tend to want too much rather than too little 
information and take too long to arrive at decisions. 
Individuals seem unable to make full use of information, 
especially when it is multidimensional" (p. 6). In an 
attempt though to address the problems that managers 
encountered, Pounds (1969) found that they "must allocate 
73
resources to questions before managers know their answers" 
(p. 1). Nutt (2002) found that this must be done prudently:
Blunders are made when decision makers use their 
time and money for costly evaluations and little 
else. . . . Little time or money is spent to
investigate claims, set objectives, search for 
ideas, measure benefits and risk, or manage 
social and political forces that can derail a 
decision, (p. 6)
Although managers usually make decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty, steps can be taken to understand 
the degree of uncertainty and minimize its impact on the 
decision. Courtney et al. (1999) explored uncertainty and 
found it can be systematically approached:
The uncertainty that remains after the best 
possible analysis has been done is what we call 
residual uncertainty .... In practice, we have 
found that the residual uncertainty facing most 
strategic-decision makers falls into one of four 
broad levels:
• Clear-Enough Future
• Alternative Futures
74
• A Range of Futures
• True Ambiguity, (pp. 5-7)
Courtney et al. explained their findings for these four 
levels in the following summary. In the first level, a 
clear-enough future exists when "the forecast will be 
sufficiently narrow to point to a single strategic 
direction." (pp. 6-7). In this level, "managers can use the 
standard strategy tool kit—market research, . . . Michael
Porter's five-forces framework, and so on" (p. 12). In the 
second level, alternative futures exist when "analysis 
cannot identify which outcome will occur, although it may 
help establish probabilities" (p. 8). In this level, 
"alternative valuations can't be handled by performing 
sensitivity analysis around a single baseline model" 
because "each scenario may require a different valuation 
model" (p. 12).
In the third level of residual uncertainty, Courtney 
et al. (1999) explained that a range of futures exists when 
"that range is defined by a limited number of key 
variables, but the actual outcome may lie anywhere along a 
continuum bounded by that range" (p. 9). In this level, 
Courtney et al. advised to:
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First, develop only a limited number of 
alternative scenarios—the complexity of juggling 
more than four or five tends to hinder decision 
making. Second, avoid developing redundant 
scenarios .... Third, develop a set of 
scenarios that collectively account for the 
probable range of future outcomes and not 
necessarily the entire possible range, (p. 14) 
"Analysis should, focus on the trigger events signaling that 
the market is moving toward one or another scenario" 
(Courtney et al., p. 13).
In the fourth level, "true ambiguity exists when 
multiple dimensions of uncertainty interact to create an 
environment that is virtually impossible to predict" 
(Courtney et al. 1999, p. 10). In this level, "usually 
[managers] can identify at least a set of variables that 
will determine how the market will evolve over time . . . . 
Managers can also indentify possible ways the market may 
evolve by studying how analogous markets developed in other 
level 4 situations" (Courtney et al., pp. 14-15). Courtney 
et al. advised that "options should be rigorously 
reevaluated whenever important uncertainties are clarified—
at least every six months..... level 4 situations are 
transitional, and most will quickly move towards levels 3 
and 2" (p. 29).
Hill et al. (1979) built upon Knight's work and said 
uncertainty exists ". . . when outcomes cannot be
predicted, even in probabilistic terms" (p. 114). Murray 
(1986) described uncertainty as the "... imperfect 
correspondence between information and the environment" (p. 
11). Courtney et al. (1999) found that "underestimating 
uncertainty can lead to strategies that neither defend 
against the threats nor take advantage of the opportunities 
that higher levels of uncertainty may provide" (p. 4). In 
further defining uncertainty, Hill et al. (1979) said that 
even "where probabilities exist, . . . one's ability to
find out those probabilities is severely limited" (p. 114).
Although it is a difficult process, Matheson and 
Matheson (1998) found that "each of the many uncertainties 
associated with a project must be quantified. 
Quantification forces people to structure the issues; it 
also surfaces additional issues and sources of uncertainty" 
(p. 47). Once something is quantified it can be measured. 
Harrison (1981) found that "the use of quantitative 
techniques in comparing and evaluating alternatives can 
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reduce uncertainty confronting the decision maker" (p. 41). 
As decision makers resolve ambiguity, McCall and Kaplan 
(1990) found and warn that they may desire to eliminate 
facts inconsistent with their developed positions, (p. 27)
To decrease the uncertainty, Luecke (2006) stated 
"what the decision maker needs is a range of possible 
outcomes for each uncertainty, as determined by experienced 
and knowledgeable informants" (p. 80). McCall and Kaplan 
(1990) reinforced this statement by saying "... more 
people will become involved in the decision as the manager 
reaches out to his or her network for advise and 
information" (p. 63). Upton's (1998) research concluded 
that "... operational flexibility is determined primarily 
by a plant's operators and the extent to which managers 
cultivate, measure, and communicate with them" (p. 132). 
Ference (1970) warned though of situations where:
More weight will be given to information provided 
by a source if the source has been used more 
often in the past, if the source has a high 
position in the organization, or if the source is 
inside, rather than external to, the 
organization, (p. B-85)
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Risk
While it may be thought that if faced with a choice 
between a known and unknown with all other things being 
equal, people would choose the known or at least options 
with higher probabilities of occurrence, Williams (2007) 
found a ". . . substantial body of literature covering the
framing effect [that] points the contrary" (p. 2). Entman 
(1993) stated that "to frame is to select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient ... in such 
a way as to promote a particular problem definition . . ." 
(p. 52). Williams found that "in order to understand fully 
the decision-making process, the role of risk perception 
must be considered" (p. 3) Outside of one's tolerance to 
risk, manipulation can present risk different than it is. 
Nutt (2002) found that "ideas with high risk can appear to 
have little or no risk merely by ignoring questions about 
risk. To push a pet idea, risk is swept under the carpet. 
Or risk may be overstated and paralyze the decision maker" 
(p. 58) . Williams borrowed from Gordon-Lubitz12 to state 
that "the way in which risk information is presented can 
affect perceptions of risk" (p. 13). Courtney et al. (1999) 
12 Gordon-Lubitz, R. J. (2003). Risk Communication: Problems of 
Presentations and Understanding. Journal of the American Medical 
Association, 289 (1), 95.
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found that "risk-adverse managers who think they are in 
very uncertain environments don't trust their gut instincts 
and suffer from decision paralysis" (p. 4). Williams 
borrowed from Edwards and Elwyn13 to state that "in 
particular, perceptions of risk are vulnerable to framing 
effects, which influence the way individuals approach risk, 
and biases the decision they make" (p. 13).
13 Edwards, A., & Elwyn, G. (2001). Understanding Risk and Lessons for 
Clinical Risk Communication About Treatment Preferences. Quality in 
Health Care, 10, 9-13.
Hill et al. (1979) used Knight again to say that "risk 
refers to situations in which outcomes can vary, but where 
the probabilities of each is known or at least can be 
estimated" (p. 114). Courtney et al. (1999) found that:
Even the most uncertain business environments 
contain a lot of strategically relevant 
information. First, it is often possible to 
identify clear trends, such as market 
demographics, that help define potential demand 
for future products and services. Second, there 
is usually a host of factors that are currently 
unknown but that are in fact knowable . . . (p.
5)
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Nutt (2002) said that "evaluations that explore risk and 
compare options to one another or to performance norms can 
be insightful. Expected results must be clear before such 
evaluations can provide useful information" (p. 35).
Heirs (1987) further commented on risk and said that 
". . . probability and contingency thinking, no matter how
thorough, cannot eliminate risk. They can only diminish it. 
. . . The next step is to weigh that risk . . (p. 100).
Meredith and Mantel (2003) took this concept of risk and 
expanded it:
To apply risk analysis, one must make assumptions 
about the probability distribution that 
characterize key parameters and variables 
associated with a decision and then use these to 
estimate the risk profiles or probability 
distributions of the outcomes of the decision (p. 
64)
Matheson and Matheson (1998) warned that "individual 
estimates made in the face of uncertainty are subject to 
biases.... People systematically put too much 
credibility in their point estimates [of uncertainties] and 
create ranges that are far too narrow" (p. 48). Meredith 
and Mantel (2003) say that point estimates are less 
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accurate than ranges when estimating variables, (p. 68) 
Matheson and Matheson (1998) agreed and found:
The operational habit of searching for the facts 
and collecting extensive data has limited value. 
Taken to its extreme, this habit buries decision 
makers under historical data and point 
projections of present trends, but arms them with 
neither intelligence nor perspective, (p. 44)
Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) related that "a further 
important psychological finding is that although the 
availability of additional information increases confidence 
in judgment, it does not necessarily increase predictive 
accuracy" (p. 127). Later in their work, Matheson and 
Matheson (1998) stated, "It is better to establish ranges 
for important variables. . . . The range itself should
reflect all judgments about possible sources of 
uncertainty" (p. 47). Courtney et al. (1999) stated that 
forecasts should be tested:
Of course, managers can discuss alternative 
scenarios and test how sensitive their forecasts 
are to changes in key variables, but the goal of 
such analysis is often to find the most likely 
outcome and create a strategy based on it. That 
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approach serves well in relatively stable 
business environments, (p. 3)
Kosko (1993) paraphrased Heisenberg and said, "The 
more one can pin down your own speed (velocity) the less 
you can pin down your position and vice versa" (pp. 104- 
105). Whether the speed of market penetration is being 
measured or some aspect of company operations, Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle14 can be applied as a check on the 
over-reliance on some type of data leading to false 
conclusions. In trying to pin down the organization's exact 
position in the market, the dynamics of the market become 
less understood.
14 Heisenberg, W. (1927). Uber den anschaulichen Inhalt der 
quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik. Zeitschrift. fur Physics, 
43, pp. 172-198.
Humans may prefer discrete occurrences over market 
functions only because precise data may be known. Einhorn 
and Hogarth (1999) advised that "inferring causality from 
just one cue often leads to serious error" (p. 139). This 
causality concept can transfer to the usage of models. 
Heirs (1987) warned that "in decision-making we should 
never fall into the trap of assuming that one model, and 
one model only, embraces all aspects of a problem" (p. 
147). Murray (1986), in discussing the integration the 
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decision making models he researched (rational, political, 
and legal), stated "that each of the three decision models 
deals, directly or indirectly, with human problems" (pp. 
218-219). When it comes to the question of using a formal 
model rather than human judgment, Einhorn and Hogarth found 
that "according to the results of psychological experiments 
on probability learning, ..." using a model will result 
in less overall error" (p. 141).
Wilson and Alexis (1962) studied decision situations 
and designated two non-mutually exclusive frameworks as 
"open" and "closed". Open frameworks "facilitate a more 
complex view of the decision process" incorporating "many 
dimensions of behavior" (pp. 150-151). Luecke (2006) said 
that "the potential impact of some uncertainties on the 
outcome of a decision are not readily apparent" (p. 83). 
This could be due to the complex nature of human behavior. 
Open models need to be used when precise data are 
unavailable. Wilson and Alexis found that the closed 
framework was the "most commonly used and accepted 
analytical framework for choice behavior or decision-making 
in organizations . . ." (p. 152). "The growth of computer
operations and effective information systems has greatly 
enhanced . . . 'closed' models," such as linear programming 
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for an objective result, (p.- 153) Hill et al. (1979) stated 
that "linear programming is a mathematical technique 
employed by decision makers to optimize resource allocation 
when confronted with certain side constraints that limit 
the range of choices" (p. 178).
Forecasting
Hill et al. (1979) simply stated the concept of 
forecasting in that "to better anticipate the future, we 
note certain trends and try to extrapolate their future 
position" (p. 188). Drucker (1954)■stated that "management 
has no choice but to anticipate the future, to attempt to 
mold it and to balance short-range and long-range goals" 
(p. 88). Drucker went on to state that planning tools are 
needed to allow businesses to development "regardless of 
the economic fluctuations to be expected over the cyclical 
period" (p. 90). Goal setting is a combination of personal 
and organizational value establishment. As such, Heirs 
(1987) warned that "once you inject human behavior into 
your calculations, then the complexities ramify beyond the 
scope of any conceivable pro.gram and we must fall back upon 
our own mental resources - our experience, reason, and 
imagination and intuition" (p. 82).
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Meredith and Mantel and Luecke agreed that computer 
simulations can reduce some uncertainties. Delays in 
construction activity occur for various reasons. Meredith 
and Mantel (2003) found that project managers assign 
probabilities to the completion time for separate and whole 
tasks "based on the beta statistical distribution . . .
rather than the more common normal distribution because it 
is highly flexible in form . . (pp. 394-395) . In trying
to define a more realistic working environment, risk 
analysis using simulation was preferred by Meredith and 
Mantel (2003) over traditional statistical analysis because 
probability assumptions can be factored in using Crystal 
Ball® software. (pp. 412-422) Luecke (2006) said that if 
operations can use a build-to-suit strategy or add customer 
finishes later, then less uncertainty about stocking 
decisions will occur, (p. 87) Chase, Aquilano, and Jacobs 
(2001) discuss the types of processes that could be used 
are make-to-order, make-to-stock, and a hybrid of these 
two. (pp. 97-98) Make-to-order removes uncertainty due to 
the order. Made-to-stock adjusts uncertainty to that of 
seasonality.
Chase et al. (2001) also discussed custom 
manufacturing as a variation on the make-to-order process 
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where a customer gives specifications to operations thus 
removing form uncertainty, (p. 726) Simchi-Levi, Simchi- 
Levi, and Kaminsky (2000) discussed delayed differentiation 
or postponement where finishes are added later as Luecke 
suggested, (pp. 181-184) Uncertainty of operations is 
minimized by delaying part of the assembly or service 
delivery. Simchi-Levi et al. (2000) described that this is 
accomplished through resquencing of operations, commonality 
where parts are somewhat interchangeable or adaptable, 
modularity where different features can be added during the 
final assembly, and standardization, where features 
demanded by most customers are added regardless of product, 
(pp. 181-184) Intangible items, such as market share, 
cannot be warehoused or moved about. This can present a 
problem of quantification, but Murray (1986) said that 
"rational concepts allow the thinker to segregate and to 
objectify otherwise unlimited intangible phenomena" (p.
51). Matheson and Matheson (1998) stated that "in the end, 
alternatives must be doable" (p. 42) .
Alternatives
Each alternative is an argument that invokes a claim 
or assertion about reality. Nutt (2002) warned that faulty 
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claims can arise when "a claim is salient [and] corresponds 
to your experience. Claims that do not are more apt to be 
dismissed or discounted" (p. 78). Ehninger (1974) discussed 
that if the evidence is accepted by the decision maker then 
the warrant is the part of the argument that relates the 
evidence to the claim, (pp. 10-11) Complex arguments will 
have more claims. One of the four types of claims that 
Ehninger provided is the reason for making a decision; 
actuative claims are "assertions that something should be 
done (or should not be done)" (p. 28). The other three 
types of claims (declarative, classificatory, and 
evaluative) that Ehninger discussed provide evidence and/or 
warrants for the actuative claim, (pp. 28-30) The 
argumentative process can be easily understood as facts 
giving support to beliefs in turn giving support to policy. 
A decision is involved in each step, but major decisions 
are usually a matter of policy determination.
Hill et al. (1979) discussed the decision matrix as a 
decision aid that "forces a detailed analysis of each 
alternative . . (p. 120). Hill et al. generated the
matrix by collecting information about alternatives, 
evaluation criteria, order of importance, weighting 
factors, and ratings, (pp. 121-126) Hill et al. believed
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this process could be used to keep track of the 
alternatives through the evaluation process, and ". . .
clearly presents the rational behind a given decision" (p. 
127) .
In reviewing alternatives, future courses of action 
need to be considered. Matheson and Matheson (1998) found 
that:
In lieu of unobtainable facts, decision makers 
must make do with information that provides 
insight into the future. That information must be 
meaningful in the sense that it selects only what 
is helpful in illuminating current decisions, 
while avoiding needless complexity. At the same 
time it must be objective and reliable, 
incorporating the best judgment of people in the 
best positions to know. (p. 44)
Harrison (1981) found that "one way to determine which 
alternative is most desirable is to test each one by 
imagining that it has already been put into effect" (p. 
38) .
Heirs (1987) said to allow inconvenient questions 
about simulations for alternatives because they offer a 
reality check and ensure that the those risks have been 
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considered as well as contingency plans for those risks, 
(p. 86) Simon (1976) stated that "in principle, factual 
propositions may be tested to determine whether they are 
true or false - whether what they say about the world 
actually occurs, or whether it does not" (p. 46).
Considered a waste of time and energy by some to address 
all foreseeable consequences and contingencies, Heirs said 
that "such so-called waste is as necessary and unavoidable" 
in the alternative evaluation stage as it was in the 
alternative generation stage and warned strong personality 
managers to temper impatience and disguise irritation over 
what they see as unrealistic futures, (p. 87) Temperance 
does not mean to give away authority over the situation. 
Heirs said that "in order to produce a useful simulation of 
the future our imagination must be harnessed to patience, 
experience, and wisdom" (p. 88). In that vein, Drucker 
(1993) said that "effective research requires organized 
abandonment .... Every product, process, service, and 
research project needs to be put on trial for its life 
every few years with this question: Would we now start this 
project . . . knowing what we know now?" (p. 285).
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CHAPTER SIX
CHOOSE THE BEST ALTERNATIVE
Introduction
Drucker (1967) found that "the understanding that 
underlies the right decision grows out of the clash and 
conflict of divergent opinions and out of the serious 
consideration of competing alternatives" (p. 143). Drucker 
(1967) stated the following about the nature of decisions: 
A decision is a judgment. It is a choice between 
alternatives. It is rarely a choice between right 
and wrong. It is at best a choice between "almost 
right" and "probably wrong"—but much more often a 
choice between two courses of action neither of 
which is provably more nearly right than the 
other, (p. 143)
Peters (1987) stated, "There are few greater 
liberating forces than the sharing of information. . . .
Knowledge is power - it always has been; it always will be" 
(p. 609). Of the multiple facets of the power of 
information that Peters (1987) shared, there are two 
pertaining directly to problem solving:
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[First,] the widespread availability of 
information is the only basis for effective day- 
to-day problem solving, which abets continuous 
improvement programs. . . . [Second,] visible
posting of information radically speeds problem 
solving and action taking, (p. 612)
As reviewed in previous sections, various issues are 
in effect during the decision process. Luecke (2006) said 
the following about making the decision:
When all the previous steps have been carried out 
properly and the decision team is in agreement on 
its objective, the team members can rationally 
evaluate each of the alternatives. Under ideal 
circumstances, the right choice will be clear. 
But in reality, some degree of personal 
preferences, ambiguity, and dissention often 
makes the final choice difficult, (p. 7)
Murray (1986) pointed out that the presence of the goal
(actual or psychological) operates to cause decisional 
choices or consequences based on quantitative analysis or 
hunch, (p. 55) In contrast to a logical progression of 
steps, Einhorn and Hogarth (1999) warned that "when people 
take actions in situations where random processes produce 
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the outcomes, they are sometimes subject to delusions of 
control" (p. 144). Support might be sought for this 
delusion.
Bias
One of the many "human foibles" that Luecke (2006) 
pointed out is that of confirming-evidence bias where 
evidence is sought to support a position and opposing or 
contrary evidence is dismissed or overlooked, (p. 108) Nutt 
(2002) found many issues with quick fixes:
Once a quick fix is discovered, decision makers 
take a defensive posture and collect information 
to justify its adoption. . . . more time and
money is spent doing this type of evaluation than 
all the other decision-making activities 
combined. . . . [resources] would be better spent
to uncover a more effective action, (p. 34)
Nutt found that "each decision maker in the debacles [he 
researched] slipped into a defensive posture, attempting to 
justify the opportunity and .defend reasons to support it" 
(p. 51). Biases will become part of the communication 
process because Ference (1970) found that "particular 
interests or concerns will determine if information is to
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be eliminated, modified, or added before being transmitted 
. . . . In addition, personal motivations may influence
what is transmitted" (p. B-84).
Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) evaluated forecasting 
and planning and found three processes to help eliminate 
bias. First, acquisition biases need to be reduced by ". .
. [sampling] from as wide a base as possible, . . . and to
strive to find information that could disconfirm hypothesis 
and forecasts" (p. 121). Wason (1960) stated that "in 
general, scientific inferences are based on the principle 
of eliminating hypotheses, while provisionally accepting 
only those which remain" (p. 129). Contrary to this, Wason 
found that "very few intelligent young adults spontaneously 
test their beliefs . . ." (p. 139). To reduce this
tendency, Wason suggested that an attitude be developed 
that "consists in a willingness to attempt to falsify 
hypotheses, and thus to test those intuitive ideas which so 
often carry the feeling of certitude" (p. 139).
Pruitt (1961) found a danger in deciding or taking a 
position to early that resonates with Wason's findings. 
Pruitt found an information disparity when comparing two 
similar decisions:
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Although the two conditions were equated in 
informational input and rational strategy, 
considerably more information was required before 
changing a decision in the Postdecisional 
Condition than before making [a] decision in the 
Predecisional Condition, (p. 439)
Drucker (1954) took a different route to find disconfirming 
information and built it into the forecast expectations and 
found that to adjust for errors in forecasting:
Any management decision must therefore contain 
provision for change, adaptation and salvage. . .
. Otherwise, despite all the technical brilliance 
in forecasting, management decisions will be 
merely wishful thinking—as all decisions based on 
long-range prediction alone inevitably are. (p. 
93-94)
In the second process to help eliminate bias, Hogarth 
and Makridakis (1981) recommended to aggregate information 
mechanically where possible because people are inefficient 
at this task. (p. 121) Here computers can offer their 
support. The third process is where Hogarth and Makridakis 
recommended that "greater care needs to be exercised in 
interpreting the apparent causes of outcomes" (p. 121). One 
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should not correlate the unrelated. Langer (1975) pointed 
out that:
People are motivated to control their 
environment. . . . The greatest satisfaction or
feeling of competence would therefore result from 
being able to control the seemingly 
uncontrollable. A second, although not entirely 
independent, reason is that there is motivation 
to avoid the negative consequences that accompany 
the perception of having no control, (p. 323)
Influences Affecting the Decision
Even if a degree of neutrality of exercised, another 
of the "human foibles" can have an impact on the decision. 
This is where personal preferences come to influence the 
decision. Luecke (2006) borrowed the terms anchoring and 
adjustment from a study of negotiation to refer "to a 
tactic that attempts to establish an initial position 
around which negotiations will take place, (p. 99) This can 
cause a premature end to the evaluation of alternatives if 
improperly used. The communication process is critical to 
arrive at a decision. Cook and Hammond (1982) found that 
consistency is required in the decision process:
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Conflict, disagreement, and misunderstanding 
among group members—are regarded as products of 
the inability of individuals to process 
information consistently and to understand the 
positions taken and judgments made by other 
members about decision issues, (p. 9)
If the stronger human influences exerted to achieve a 
desired result are the seeking of conforming evidence and 
the anchoring of positions, then the softer human 
influences affecting a decision maker are of conformity and 
groupthink. Luecke (2006) said "... that individuals 
within a group . . . are subject to the influences of those
around them, even when they have the power to ignore them 
in making a final decision" (p. 117). Hartwick et al.
(1982) found that group biases induced long-term influence 
on individual bias such that more information was recalled 
for a favored option and other information was suppressed 
for an opposing option, (pp. 42-43) Hoffman (1982) likewise 
found that "often the [group] members' information about 
the problem was overlooked, rejected, or distorted during 
the discussion" and that "sometimes groups agreed early on 
a solution and were difficult to shake loose" (p. 99). Nutt 
(2002) agreed and found that "people become anchored by the 
first information they observe and give it more weight than 
information that arrives later on" (p. 77). One reason for 
this difficulty comes when information was evaluated and 
integrated into the decision process. Ference (1970) 
proposed that "the extent to which information is altered 
as it is carried through a communication network will 
depend on the source, content, and point of entry of the 
information" (p. B-85).
Janis (1971) used the term groupthink "to refer to a 
mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence - 
seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive group that it 
tends to override realistic appraisal of alternate courses 
of action" (p. 43). To combat influence, Luecke (2006) 
suggested having the team members "privately write down 
their judgment before the views of other participants are 
known" (p. 119). Luecke said that the convergence in 
groupthink ". . .is less driven by objectivity than by
social psychological pressures" (p. 120). If the derived 
majority view is objectively valid then it should be free 
of social pressures. To check this, Luecke said someone 
needs to "challenge the assumptions and conclusions of the 
majority .... and deal with facts and ideas that 
conflict with their own" (p. 121).
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Objectivity can come from an unbiased presentation of 
the facts. Ehninger (1974) pointed out that "argument is 
superior to alternative methods of decision making" and 
that "the person who acts out of the self-convincing 
process of argument understands not only what he is to do, 
but also why he is to do it" (p. 6) . Understanding why 
something should be done doeis not always make it palatable. 
Harrison (1981) found that "the best alternative for the 
decision maker may be quite distasteful to the people or 
organizations affected" (p. 41). Heirs (1987) agreed and 
borrowed from Drucker stating that "real debate between 
people with conflicting views is not just unavoidable, it 
is absolutely essential. The best answers . . . [may]
arouse the most controversy" (p. 62).
After the alternatives have' been evaluated, Murray 
(1986) pointed out that the rational process will allow for 
the deliberate selection of alternatives from a preference 
ranking of possibilities, (p. 54) Sometimes that ranking is 
legislated or forced on the decision maker. Lowi (1979) 
stated that "laws set priorities. Laws deliberately set 
some goals and values above others" (p. 92). Sometimes the 
alternative that is the best choice is not legally 
permitted, and it would require extra effort in order to 
99
change the law or regulation. This extra effort if brought 
into the evaluation process may make this choice less 
preferable.
Decision Rules
Hill et al. (1979) presented two decision rules that 
are dependent on the decision maker's forecasts in fairly 
stable markets because "they do not take into account the 
probability of future" changes to the parameters of the 
forecast, (p. 130) The maximax decision rule is optimistic 
and less probable or risky in that the best outcomes are 
considered for the alternatives and "the action with the 
greatest maximum" is chosen. (Hill et al., p. 130) The 
maximin decision rule is pessimistic and conservative in 
that the worst outcomes are considered for the alternatives 
and "the action that maximizes the minimums" is chosen.
(Hill et al., p. 130) Drucker (1954) recommended this as an 
approach to "free decisions from cyclical guesswork by 
testing the business decision against the worst possible 
and sharpest possible setback that past experience could 
lead us to expect" (p. 90).
Heirs (1987) presented a third decision rule based on 
game theory and decision trees. The minimax decision rule 
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is realistic and "assumes that while he himself will always 
make the move which maximizes his own chances of winning, 
his opponents will always make moves which minimize those 
chances" (p. 83). Harrison (1981) studied maximizing and 
found that the underlying assumptions are faulty:
Objectives are not fixed. The known set of 
alternatives is always incomplete because it is 
impossible to obtain perfect information. . . .
Many of the variables that must be considered in 
any attempt at maximization are not easily 
quantified. Therefore, a precise preference 
ranking of the firm's objectives or alternatives 
that will maximize outcome is most unlikely, (p. 
92)
Approximations
A manager's decisions are usually made with less than 
perfect information. Murray (1986) said that "rational 
decision making, then, does not require complete knowledge 
but only enough to make choices based on preferences" (p. 
55). Heirs (1987) said that the decision-thinking process 
is seldom perfect, but through preparation risk is 
minimized, and decisions can be made confidently, (pp. 96- 
97) Baumol and Quandt (1964) experimented with this concept 
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by combining algebraic equations with statistical 
estimation and simulations to develop of rules of thumb 
that approximated the true values being sought; they termed 
this process as the optimally imperfect decision, (p. 26) 
Kosko (1993) calls making a decision based on enough 
information as using the fuzzy principle, (pp. 177-178) Tan 
et al. (2006) relayed that "Lofti Zadeh introduced fuzzy 
set theory and fuzzy logic in 1965 as a way of dealing with 
imprecision and uncertainty." Objects do not have to equate 
to 0 or 1, false or true to be imputed as such. (p. 578) 
This finds an application in data mining cluster analysis. 
Having enough information and persuasion, even though more 
could be provided from both evidence and warrants so that 
the claim of the argument is accepted, is at the heart of 
fuzzy logic. Matheson and Matheson (1998) stated that 
"information quality involves a shift of emphasis from the 
tangible world we know to the potential world we seek to 
understand" (p. 45).
Fuzzy Logic
Kosko (1993) used his Fuzzy Approximation Theorem to 
define problems with fuzzy patches and fuzzy sets. (p. 167) 
Kosko stated, "What really counts with fuzzy systems, the 
real value added, is the tie between words and sets and 
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between knowledge and patches" (p. 177). Fuzzy systems 
appear by defining a fuzzy patch and then seeing where the 
unions occur or by establishing fuzzy sets. Kosko stated, 
"Sloppy rules (if-then) give big patches. Fine rules give 
small patches" (p. 167). This system could be used to 
decide where to open a store based on demographics, 
shopping patterns, and other items used as sets. The 
location within the fuzzy system would depend on the 
magnitude of the decision. Matheson and Matheson (1998) 
pointed out that' "except for the few truly critical issues, 
decision quality rarely requires great precision: a well- 
informed approximation is usually adequate" (p. 49).
Kosko (1993) gave an example of an automated fuzzy 
system as one that Isuzu, Nissan, and Mitsubishi use to 
regulate their cruise controls, (p. 185) Speed is regulated 
based on the forces acting on the vehicle and on the fuel 
and braking needs inferred based on fuzzy parameters. Yeh 
and Li (2003) described a multistage fuzzy inference engine 
as "decision-making logic, which employs fuzzy rules from 
the fuzzy rule bases, to determine a mapping from the fuzzy 
sets in the input universe of discourse Ux to the fuzzy set 
in the output universe of discourse Uy" (p. 257) . From the 
discussion on framing issue, the fixing of the world that 
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the rational model needs is similar to fuzzy sets and 
patches developed as the team models a form of reality.
Hill et al. (1979) reached back to work of Lewin
(1935) in social psychology to review intrapersonal 
conflict and the reasons why managers vacillate between 
choices. Lewin experimented with three main areas of 
conflict: approach-approach, avoidance-avoidance, and 
approach-avoidance.15 All these types of conflicts delay the 
selection of the alternative that will be implemented, (pp. 
122-123) Hill et al. found that these conflicts arise 
separately per situation the closer one gets to making a 
choice for an alternative, (pp. 60-61) Hill et al. found 
that approach-approach conflicts arise where two beneficial 
alternatives exit. When one alternative is about to be 
chosen, then the good aspects of another alternative are 
remembered and thus opportunity costs come to bear on the 
decision. Avoidance-avoidance conflicts arise where two 
negative alternatives exit, and the least damaging one must 
be chosen. Approach-avoidance conflicts arise where the 
decision maker is ambivalent to an alternative. On the one
15 Lewin's 1935 work on personality contained three selected papers from 
other authors. Lewin's work on conflict seems to rely or build upon one 
of the papers: Murchison, C. (1933). Handbook of child psychology (2nd 
ed.). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press.
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hand, when an alternative is being considered, its negative 
aspects become known and causes an avoidance of an 
alternative. On the other hand, when that alternative is 
avoided, then the salient positive aspects of the 
alternative are remembered thus setting up the conflict, 
(pp. 59-61) 
Choice Conflict and Resolution
Research could go on endlessly, but the decision would 
never be made. The dangers of that path have been 
previously discussed. Luecke (2006) stated that "knowing 
when to end deliberations is often difficult" (p. 70). Some 
team members would be comfortable with the data collected 
and others would not. Every method choice has advantages 
and disadvantages, but Hill .et al. (1979) found two needs 
of the decision maker that help cut through the 
intrapersonal conflicts. First is the need for simplicity 
that "enables the decision maker to impose a framework that 
organizes a set of choices and events in such a way that 
action can be taken." The negative side to this is "that it 
blinds the decision maker to the sublety of the choices 
available to him" (Hill et al., p. 63). Second is the need 
for consistency. "In choosing among alternative options, 
the decision maker typically needs to behave in ways that 
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maintain or restore consistency among the several 
attitudes, beliefs, and values that are part of his 
personal context" (Hill et al., p. 64).
Hoffman (1982) defined a process model whereby 
decisions implicitly or explicitly move through defining, 
specifying, generating, evaluating, and implementing 
phases, (pp. 110-111) While implicit movement through the 
phases may be more thorough and generate more valence with 
the group members, it could require more resources than 
management feels is necessary to effect a decision. Thus an 
explicit choice by a group leader or overseeing manager can 
move the process along. Luecke (2006) said that deciding 
too early could overlook the benefits of a better choice. 
Deciding too late could be detrimental to operations or 
industry position, (p. 70) Harrison (1981) found that "all 
that is necessary to make the choice a rational one is that 
an objective exist and that the decision maker perceive and 
select some alternative that promises to meet the 
objective" (p. 82). Heirs (1987) said that after 
alternatives have been generated and expanded, the decision 
maker "assesses their relative strengths and weaknesses, 
attractions and disadvantages, risks and rewards, and 
chooses the one which he judges to be preferable" (p. 149).
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The next chapter will explore data and information systems 
issues and functionalities to prepare for the integrating 
discussion of where GIS can positively influence many of 
the issues confronting the decision maker. Some things like 
managing a value system are not applicable to GIS.
Uncovering patterns and objectively displaying alternatives 
through complex processing to minimize the negative human 
influences, blunders, and idea imposition tactics are 
strengths of GIS.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DATA, DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS, AND 
GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Data and Systems
Just as words make sentences that in turn make 
paragraphs, decisions are based on available information 
that is derived from data. Data leads to information that 
leads to knowledge that leads to better decision making. In 
the absence of data, judgment must be used, but even that 
is based on data of past experience. Organizations both 
public and private create, process, store, and retrieve 
data as part of their functions. Whether the purpose of the 
data are financial for billing, inventory control for 
manufacturing, personal for governmental processing, or 
demographic for marketing, data are being created and 
stored for current or later use by internal or external 
users.
Huxhold (1993) reviewed the progress of data 
processing from the 1950s until his day and found that 
after the initial transaction-based systems were developed, 
data-oriented applications were devised using database 
management systems. That shift "changed the focus of 
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information systems design" (p. 61). Systems were being 
developed that reached beyond the organizational structure 
"to information-oriented processing, which supports the 
information needs of operations, management, and strategic 
planning of the organization, regardless of the 
organizational framework in which they are performed" 
(Huxhold, p. 61).
Kendall and Kendall (2008) related that "transaction 
processing systems (TPS) function at the operational level 
of the organization" (p. 2). Power (2001a) stated that TPS 
"are designed to expedite and automate transaction 
processing, record keeping, and simple business reporting 
of transactions" (Major Differences, 1). TPS generate 
massive amount of data. Tan et al. (2006) observed that 
"often, traditional data analysis tools and techniques 
cannot be used because of the massive size of a data set" 
(p. 1). Internet purchases and banking transactions can 
create these sizes of data sets due to the millions of 
customers and account holders involved.
How those data are best organized and stored using 
logical data modeling and physical database design 
techniques, such as data warehousing, is the subject for 
systems analysts, database designers and administrators.
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Users are not normally involved with data design. 
Cattenstart and Scholten (1999) supported this and found 
that "the user is not interested in the way data are 
organized in the database. .• . . What is important to the
user is that the system is capable of accommodating the 
user's view of the world" (p. 171).
Decision Support Systems
DSS are higher forms of information systems that use 
data generated by TPS and other systems to "support 
decision making in all its phases" while leaving the actual 
decision up to the decision maker. (Kendall & Kendall 2008, 
p. 3) In reviewing the history of DSS, Oz (2000) found that 
DSS were developed to assist managers because they had ". .
. neither the time nor the resources to study and absorb 
long, detailed reports of data and information . . ." (p.
21). The next level up in information systems would be the 
realm of expert systems and artificial intelligence; rules 
developed by knowledgeable people (employees or 
consultants) would by used to build these systems to derive 
and select "... the best solution to a problem or a 
specific class of problem" (Kendall & Kendall, p. 4). These 
rule-based systems have a place in capturing and 
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transferring organizational learning, but this paper will 
explore DSS and their role to support the decision maker. 
DSS architecture, networking, and security issues will not 
be discussed in this paper so that the main concepts can be 
fully developed, but these issues should be addressed when 
developing a DSS.
Groups have different needs than a single manger when 
making a decision. Those needs come with specific problems 
and synergies. Jankowski and Nyerges (2001) found that 
trends towards flatter organizational structures and group 
involvement "... created the need for information 
technology capable of supporting participatory decision 
making" (p. 2). Kendall and Kendall (2008) found that DSS 
can be designed for group use with beneficial results:
Group decision support systems (GDSS) software 
can be designed to minimize typical negative 
group behaviors, such as lack of participation 
due to fear of reprisal for expressing an 
unpopular or contested viewpoint, domination by 
vocal group members, and "group think" decision 
making, (p. 4)
Groups are able to coordinate their activities from 
anywhere via the internet or organizational intranet given 
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they have access to the necessary data and other tools. 
Jankowski and Nyerges (2001) found that groups can meet in 
three other types of space-time venues in addition to the 
traditional face-to-face meeting;15 the other three are: 
"different-place and different-time (distributed) meeting, 
same-place and different-time (storyboarding) meeting, and 
different-place and same-time (conference call) meeting" 
(p. 49) .
Interfaces for the human to computer interaction are 
important for the smooth functioning of any information 
system. GIS are no different, and Hirschfield, Brown, and 
Marsden (1991) found that:
Typically, such an interface provides the user 
with specifically designed menu screens or some 
other means of choosing between a number of 
alternative courses of action. . . for example,
the selection of data sets, the scale of 
analysis, the method of analysis, and so on. (p. 
158)
DSS must be reasonable to use or decision makers will 
likely bypass this tool. (Power 2001b, Introduction 1,
16 Original material was referenced as Jarke, M. (1986) . Knowledge 
sharing and negotiation support in multiperson decision support 
systems. Decision Support Systems, 2 (1), 93-102.
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hpl) Power (2001b) suggested that seven issues are 
important in evaluating a user interface:
• User interface style
• Screen design and layout
• The Human-Software interaction sequence
• Use of colors, lines, and graphics
• Information density
• Use of icons and symbols
• Choice of input and output devices (User 
Interfaces, 6, hp2)
Command line interfaces, while powerful, are hard to learn 
due to their specificity. Most programs use a combination 
of menus, icons, and graphical interfaces. These allow 
flexibility and familiarity.
Power (2001a) derived five main categories of DSS from
Alter's proposed taxonomy:17 data-driven DSS, model-driven 
DSS, knowledge-driven DSS, document-driven DSS, and 
communications-driven DSS. (Five Main Categories of DSS, 
1-5) The technology and functionality of computer systems 
continue to grow and expand as time progresses. Originally
17 Alter, S. (1980) Decision support systems: Current practice and 
continuing challenges. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
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Power had placed GIS only in the data-driven DSS category.
Power understood though that new technologies and the 
internet would change the landscape of DSS. GIS, such as 
ESRI's ArcGIS and Pitney Bowes' Mapinfo, incorporate the 
functions and attributes of data-driven and knowledge- 
driven DSS. Power (2001a) described a data-driven DSS as 
focusing on "access to and manipulation of large databases 
of structured data and especially a time-series of internal 
company data and some times external data" (Five Main 
Categories of DSS, U 1).
Data Mining
Data mining techniques fall under knowledge-driven DSS 
and have the ability to provide understanding and solve 
some of the problems of the data domain. Hidden patterns 
can be sought out of large data sets. (Power 2001a, Five 
Main Categories of DSS, 1) Openshaw (1994) provided a 
definition of pattern and stated:
In a GIS, pattern may often be viewed as a 
localised excess of concentration of data cases 
that are unusual, and thus of potential interest, 
either because of the intensity of their 
localised concentration or because of their
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predictability over time or their similarity in 
terms of their features. . . . It is far better
if the scale and nature of any pattern can emerge 
from the analysis rather than be imposed upon it. 
(p. 89)
This last concept of emergence will come up again in Nutt's 
comparison of the discovery process and idea imposition 
process. Although model-driven, document-driven, and 
communication-driven DSS are important tools for 
management, they are not the focus of this paper and will 
not be discussed. Some aspects of GDSS can be considered in 
the realm of communication-driven DSS.
Tan et al. (2006) found that "data mining is an 
integral part of knowledge discovery in databases, which is 
the overall process of converting raw data into useful 
information . . ." (p. 3). Tan et al. described this
process as one that includes in order: input data, data 
preprocessing, data mining, postprocessing, ending with 
information. GIS can use geocoding (giving a latitudinal 
and longitudinal spatial position to data) and feature 
selection to help prepare the data. (p. 3) Tan et al. found 
that data usually needs to be prepared for use:
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Data preprocessing include[s] fusing data from 
multiple sources, cleaning data to remove noise 
and duplicate observations, and selecting records 
and features that are relevant to the data mining 
task at hand. (p. 3)
Many times during brainstorming, certain features are not 
excluded in order to stimulate other alternatives.
Geographic Information Systems
Components
GIS can help identify and map points, lines, and 
polygons that will impact the decision, such as location of 
fire hydrants, legal boundaries, and flood plains. Weilar 
(1993) found regarding GIS data:
. . . geographic locations, distributions, and
patterns are effectively described by points, 
lines, and polygons .... Points equal sites in 
GIS. Sites can represent anything located in the 
real world to which x-y coordinates or a location 
identifier can be assigned. . . . Lines equal
connections or links between and among points or 
sites in the real world in a GIS. . . . Polygons
equal areas, zones, regions, surfaces, or spaces 
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contained within sets of observable or conceptual 
lines in GIS. (pp.. 8-9)
Bailey (1994) reviewed statistical spatial analysis 
techniques and stated that:
Locational data consists purely of the locations 
at which a set of events occurred. . . .
Attribute data consists of values, or attributes, 
associated with a set of locations .... 
Finally, interaction data consists of 
quantitative measurements each of which is 
associated with a link, or pair of locations, 
(pp. 17-18)
See Appendix E for the types of attributes. Haining (1994) 
found that spatial analysis "requires information both on 
attribute values and the geographical locations of the 
objects to which the collection of attributes are attached" 
(p. 45). Temporal analysis can be used to track historical 
patterns of attributes and/or interactions and project the 
future direction of growth, contraction, or stasis. Just to 
keep in mind that organizations are not the only users of 
GIS, doctors researching or monitoring conditions 
physically and temporally can also use GIS because "GIS 
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techniques have even been applied to the analysis of genome 
sequences on DNA" (Longley, Goodchild, Maguire, and Rhind 
2001, p. 5).
Capabilities
GIS perform various types of analyses on data and 
produce maps based on chosen locational parameters. Any 
number of maps or views of the data can yield insight or 
produce more questions for further exploration of the 
issues. Data can be aggregated for clarity or left 
unchanged and plotted for a different visual effect. Data 
can be analyzed temporally, spatially, statistically and in 
combination of these methods for use in forecasting, 
generating alternatives, and depicting situations. While 
GIS process mainly geographic data quite well, Visvalingam 
(1991) found:
However, data collection and aggregation need not 
be based exclusively on spatial (or geographic) 
criteria. The temporal dimension may provide a 
better framework for some other classes of 
applications which need either to identify 
critical events (as opposed to critical areas) or 
to predict, monitor and control the consequence 
of events . . . (p. 13)
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Thrall (2002) found that "GIS technology is the vehicle for 
making the [visualization] procedure more efficient, 
accurate, and accessible to analysts, and it increases the 
productivity of the analyst . . (p. 86). Either through
a group setting with GGIS or in a stand alone 
configuration, GIS provide tools to enable an organization 
to learn.
Landis (1993) reviewed GIS software and found it 
capable of performing the following sets of functions:
. . . presentation and thematic mapping; data
query; spatial query; database integration and 
updating; routing and minimum path analysis; 
buffering; point-in-polygoning; overlay; and 
distance, adjacency and proximity analysis, (p. 
26)
See Appendix F for a categorization of these functions. 
Bailey (1994) likewise found these spatial summarization 
techniques powerful as a prerequisite to spatial analysis, 
(p. 16) Hirschfield, Brown, and Marsden (1991) found that 
"the basic manipulation of data involves the sorting, 
aggregation and merging or records, their selective sub­
setting and cross-tabulation and the cross-referencing of 
data items to derive new variables" (pp. 157-158) .
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GIS need data to process. These data can come from 
internal (organization) sources or external (market) 
sources. Not all internal data are centralized, integrated, 
and accessible. Moore (1993) interviewed individuals in 
organizations acquiring GIS to understand the main reasons 
involved, (p. 83) All respondents saw it as a better way of 
processing their work flow because accessibility to 
departmental data by the other parts of the organization 
allowed databases to become integrated. (Moore, p. 86) An 
ancillary benefit was "that the acquisition would force the 
departments to finally 'clean up' their data so that the 
GIS databases could be populated" (Moore, p. 86).
Data Mining Applications
Data mining techniques give current GIS the power to 
find relationships in data. Tan et al. (2006) defined two 
major categories of data mining tasks: predictive and 
descriptive, (p. 7) DSS primarily use predictive models, 
but GIS makes use of both predictive and descriptive 
models. In the two major categories of tasks, four tasks 
are the main elements of data mining: predictive modeling, 
association analysis, cluster analysis, and anomaly 
detection. Predictive modeling builds relationships between 
data to derive rules to explain discrete and continuous 
120
target variables. Association analysis discovers patterns 
that describe data associates. Cluster analysis finds 
groups of similar data. Anomaly detection identifies 
significantly nonconforming data. (Tan et al., pp. 7-11) 
These tasks are called by Keller and Thalmann (1999) a 
process-centered approach to sharing graphic presentations 
through the access, query, and manipulation of geospatial 
data by "a data manipulation language or through an 
application programming interface (API)" (p. 152). Most GIS 
have these for power users.
The process of data mining discussed by Power (2001c) 
agreed with that of Tan et al. (2006) and is said to 
usually follow these steps: selection and preparation of 
the data to be mined, qualification of the data, selection 
and use of the data mining tool(s), and application of the 
information. (Data Mining Process, 1, hp 13) GIS give 
tools to prepare the data, but usually this is done 
externally in a database or spreadsheet program; the file 
is then saved with a comma delineated format or other 
format that the GIS can import and use. Some GIS can use a 
database directly through the Open Database Connectivity 
(ODBC) standard. GIS can then qualify the data through 
selection queries. Bailey (1994) found that advanced 
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statistical techniques, such as kernel and Bayesian 
smoothing methods could identify areas of homogeneity, 
possible models, and analyze "how well models fit the 
observed data" (p. 27). Where the data are not homogeneous 
but instead heterogeneous, a larger sample will be required 
"to capture the full variability of attribute values at all 
possible locations" (Longley et al. 2001, p. 105).
Sargent (1999) compared the work of analysts to GIS 
and found that:
. . . operational use of geographic information
in a multi-user, multi-organisation application, 
adds significant new requirements in data 
maintenance, data transformation, lineage 
tracking, schema maintenance and metadata update, 
(p. 41)
These issues will not be covered in this paper, but are 
mentioned here to advise the information department staff 
to be prepared to handle these issues in support of the 
decision makers.
Data Issues
GIS have not always been able to share data as easily 
as they do today as evidenced by two international 
conferences on Interoperating GIS: 1997 in Santa Barbara, 
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California, and 1999 in Zurich, Switzerland. (Vckovski, 
Brassel, & Schek 1999, preface) Stock and Puller (1999) 
found that data heterogeneity prevented effective data 
sharing. "Data heterogeneity can be classified into 
schematic heterogeneity, syntactic heterogeneity and 
semantic heterogeneity." Semantic heterogeneity is the most 
common data sharing problem and "refers to differences in 
the definition of concepts and the rules that are used to 
determine whether a real world entity is an example of a 
concept" (Stock and Puller, p. 232). If any of these 
heterogeneities exist, then the data's use in problem 
solving in greatly hindered. (Stock and Puller, pp. 231- 
232) This is a specialized area of research and will not be 
dealt with in this paper.18 It will be assumed that these 
issues have been solved for decision making purposes.
18 For a review of heterogeneity as it relates to GIS, see Getis, A.
(1994). Spatial dependence and heterogeneity and proximal databases. In 
S. Fotheringham, & P. Rogerson. (Eds.). Spatial analysis and GIS. (105- 
120). London: Taylor and Francis, Ltd.
Wiederhold (1999) stated that "the objective of 
interoperation is to increase the value of information when 
information from multiple sources is accessed, related, and 
combined" (p. 1). Due to the ever expanding list of data 
sources, Wiederhold advised care in preventing the decision
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maker from becoming overwhelmed by data. Data from sources 
is not integrated but instead only selected results derived 
from the combination of sources, (p. 1) Sargent (1999) 
pointed out that sometimes the results need to be recorded 
and made permanent in a database, but at other times the 
results can be transient as with query results, (p. 44) The 
development of options sets or "clusters of options deemed 
important . . . based on different thresholds for criteria
or geographic location" can be filtered through "Boolean 
operations in a query language" to lend insight to the 
problem at hand. (Jankowski and Nyerges 2001, p. 19) The 
need to record the results will depend on the permanency 
and accessibility of the data source.
Analysis and Presentation
GIS are very good at presenting the results visually, 
and GIS make use of many different icons to convey the 
system functions. Before the advent of GIS and continuing 
until today, SPSS0, Minitab0, and other statistical packages 
have analyzed databases to produce information. Location­
based information from these packages is still in report 
form and is limited in overall impact to the viewer. GIS 
present the summary data pictorially in map form giving the 
reader or viewer with a clearer understanding of the 
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underlying descriptive data. GIS can turn descriptive data 
into predictive information through extrapolating the 
trends uncovered. GIS allow a user to drill down for 
detailed views or drill up for summary or aggregate views 
of the data. (Power 2001d, Data-Driven DSS Overview, 2 
,hp2)
These relationships, whether found through data mining 
efforts, spatial analysis, or kriging, can bring insight to 
the decision process. Clark's (2001) research showed that 
geostatistics, of which kriging is a method, can solve most 
problems involving the distribution of a variable in one, 
two, or three dimensions, (p. 3) Clark's work provided "the 
simplest application of the Theory of Regionalised 
Variables, that of producing the 'best' estimation of the 
unknown value at some location within an ore deposit" (p. 
5). Although this specific application is the focus of her 
work, Clark stated that "estimation techniques can be used 
wherever a continuous measure is made on a sample at a 
particular location in space (or time), i.e., where a 
sample value is expected to be affected by its position and 
its relationships with its neighbors" (p. 5). This gives 
rise to many applications in marketing and operations 
decision making.
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Clark (2001) said the following about attempting to 
analyze market potential of an area:
Kriging can be used to produce the close grid of 
values necessary to the plotting of contour maps. 
. . . One of the advantages of kriging as an
interpolation technique is that every estimate is 
accompanied by a corresponding kriging standard 
deviation. Thus, for any contour map of values, a 
companion map of "reliability" can be produced, 
(pp. 107-108)
The assignment of value to the outcomes of an analysis can 
now be tempered by rationality, and the risk of uncertainty 
can be reduced. Although Longley et al. (2001) found many 
forms of kriging, the goal of this type of spatial 
interpolation is to take measurements "and then to apply 
these properties in estimating the missing parts . . (p.
297). Kriging also provides an avenue for possible savings 
through focused advertising or outreach programs. Clark 
stated that "an additional advantage of kriging as an 
estimation technique is that the maps and/or calculations 
of the 'standard errors' can be produced without actually 
taking the samples" (p. 109). Many decisions have a 
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location component. When location is a major factor in both 
processing data and providing output, GIS are often the 
best DSS. (Oz 2000, p. 471)
GIS can process ordered data involving attributes with 
relationships in time and space. Longley et al. (2001) 
stated that this "ability to combine the general with the 
specific" gives GIS strength as a tool for problem-solving, 
(p. 8) If the ordered data are combined, then GIS can 
handle variations in up to four dimensions giving the 
decision maker sufficient room to explore alternatives. Tan 
et al. (2006) equated sequential data with temporal data 
having a time element. Records with time series data, 
showing the changes (or lack thereof) of an item over time, 
can allow for temporal autocorrelation. This may allow for 
a smaller sample size with similar results than with using 
a regular sample size. (pp. 33-35) GIS handle spatial data 
the best due to the location component. This can allow for 
spatial autocorrelation that Longley et al. (2001) stated 
as "quantify[ing] the degree to which near and more distant 
things are interrelated" by way of their attributes, (p.
99)
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Hoos (1972) warned not to gather "data more because 
they are available than indicative" (p. 8). O'Kelly (1994) 
agreed and advised that although there is an:
. . . increased availability of adjacency 'facts'
from topologically integrated databases, . . .
There is little to be gained by making spatial 
autocorrelation one of the many descriptive 
statistics collected from a spatial database, 
unless the sophistication of the user is 
sufficient to make correct use of this 
information, (pp. 71-72)
Likewise in agreement is Openshaw (1994) who found that 
people were urged "to analyse data purely because they are 
now available for analysis, despite the absence of either 
an a priori experimental design or testable hypothesis" (p. 
83) .
GIS have procedures to handle data accuracy issues: 
outliers, missing values, and duplicate data. Outliers can 
be queried out and eliminated from the display. Missing 
values can be estimated through proximity analysis. 
Duplicate data can be masked to show only one instance of 
that data; the caveat here is to make sure duplicate data 
are not aggregate into a larger value when displayed.
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Aggregation is appropriate for drilling up. (Tan et al. 
2006, pp. 40-46) Bailey (1994) reviewed the statistical 
techniques in GIS and found that GIS could "address 
existing deficiencies in data selection and aggregation 
algorithms, such as areal interpolation, . . . error
propagation, . . . and missing value interpolation" (p.
16). GIS have proximity analysis as a basic feature, so 
there will not be a discussion on the selection of the 
correct proximity measure.19
19 For a discussion on proximity measurements and cluster evaluation see 
Tan et al. chapters 2 and 8 respectively.
The result of a successful data mining procedure is 
information. To get that information across in a usable 
form, it must be presented in an understandable form. Tan 
et al. (2006) advised the following about data 
visualization:
Successful visualization requires that the data
(information) be converted into a visual format 
so that the characteristics of the data and the 
relationships among the data items or attributes 
can be analyzed or reported. . . . The overriding
motivation for using visualization is that people 
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can quickly absorb large amounts of visual 
information and find patterns in it. (p. 105) 
What functions GIS cannot do remains the responsibility of 
the manager to purvey, which are to set the stage, to 
manage value systems, to deal with politics only to name a 
few, and finally to choose the alternative best suited to 
solve the issue at hand. It can help to frame the issue by 
displaying historical data and patterns, displaying ideas 
in the alternative generation stage, accepting group input 
from disparate locations, evaluating and projecting 
alternative future outcomes, and displaying these with 
consistency and objectivity. With that insight, the final 
chapter will explore the many decision-making issues to see 
where GIS may assist to minimize or control the errors and 
maximize the quality and quantity of decision alternatives 
generated for choice.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ASSISTANCE FROM GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Introduction
GIS are a form of DSS, and this tool leaves the 
manager to make the final decision. Along the journey from 
problem identification to solution selection, many forces 
implicitly and explicitly affect the decision process; some 
forces are subtle, and some forces are overt. It is up to 
the decision maker to set the stage and frame the issue 
properly. This person may or may not need assistance from 
others. If a group is to be established, whether local of 
dispersed, that situation brings with it many human 
influences both negative and beneficial. The resources of 
time, personnel, and budget available will impact the 
degree of investigation. This section will recap the 
decision-making process and point out where GIS can assist 
with this process and where it is not applicable.
Decisions can be strategic or operational; both can 
require complex analysis to effect a proper course of 
action. By nature, the strategic decision will have a 
greater impact on the organization. Longley et al. (2001) 
found that "... strategic operations require a range of 
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spatial analytical tools and data types, and entail a move 
from 'what-is' visualization to 'what-if' forecasts and 
predictions" (p. 40). An incorrect operational decision 
though can quickly have a negative impact on the 
organization. These decisions can hopefully be reversed or 
corrected if the proper statistical process control 
monitoring and control tools are in place, such as proper 
sampling procedures, x-bar charts for monitoring the 
centering of the process, and range charts for monitoring 
the variation in the process (Evans and Lindsay 2005, p. 
694). Bromley and Coulson (1991) found that GIS contribute 
to "improvements in operations largely stem[ming] from the 
combination of better mapping and the quicker access 
possible to a greater range of data sets" (p. 55) .
Situational Analysis
First, it is important to know the current state of 
affairs that the organization finds itself. If the 
organization is aware of its strategic position, the 
actions of its competitors, and the environmental 
influences acting on its operations, then the first 
question can be asked if a decision is required to address 
some issue the organization is facing. The do nothing
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alternative that Drucker reminds managers of comes after 
some research. GIS can assist the manager to display the 
current situation in many different facets. If temporal 
data are available, then forecasts are possible through 
means of extrapolation. Multiple layers can managed the 
show different maps or views of an area of concern to 
examine the situation. Paper reports have their place, but 
often the common saying that "a picture is worth a thousand 
words" holds true; GIS view can aggregate many pages of a 
report or reports into a cohesive view of a situation. 
Castle (1993) found that GIS have the capability of 
"efficiently conveying considerable amounts of information 
and for showing spatial relationships not discernable in 
tabular or textual documents . . (p. 87). If it is found
that the situation will not resolve itself, then a decision 
must be made to intervene.
The rational model approach described by this paper 
flows logically through situation analysis and information 
gathering to alternative generation to alternative 
evaluation to alternative selection and finally to 
implementation. GIS can help with all these phases. As each 
of these phases are examined in detail, certain aspects 
involved with these phases will be found to have human 
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components, only some of which can compensated for by GIS. 
An example of component that GIS cannot compensate for is 
what Nutt (2002) called the management of social and 
political pressures, (pp. 41-42)
Nutt (2002) outlined seven blunders that can occur 
during the decision process and their corresponding 
corrective practices (See Appendixes A and B). The first, 
fourth, fifth, and seventh practices can be aided by GIS. 
As a tool, GIS can play a greater or lesser role in each of 
these four practices. To review all seven practices, first, 
the decision maker can act to involve others to define the 
issues; GIS can help by displaying to the decision maker 
and others what the situation is. Second, the decision 
maker is better suited to "consider the interests and 
commitment of stakeholders" (Nutt, p. 28). Third, when 
analyzing a situation, the decision maker must define what 
goal or outcome is expected or the research will flounder. 
Fourth, GIS can present a number of options for 
consideration to increase the search for alternatives 
depending on the underlying data. Fifth, as with practice 
four, alternatives can be generated, but it is up to the 
decision maker to assign probabilities to alternatives in 
order for risk to be calculated. Various GIS views can then 
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be labeled accordingly and stored for later analysis or 
reporting. Sixth, the decision maker must deal with the 
ethical considerations that an alternative presents; GIS 
will not know what is acceptable or defined as ethical by 
the group affected. Seventh, GIS can enable an organization 
to learn, but the decision maker must try to promote an 
open review of the process that led to the decision good or 
bad.
Nutt (2002) warned of not "... jump[ing] on the 
first idea that comes along . . (p. 5). At first,
inexperienced users of GIS may be temped to do this because 
they may have never seen data relationships displayed so 
clearly. Weilar (1993) found that a virtually "unlimited 
number of and diversity of sites" could be entered into 
GIS, and "also information about locations of sites and 
their spatial relationships can be visually shown on maps" 
(p. 9). De Geus and Tan et al. (2006) discussed mental 
models and their fluidity, which is affected by data 
availability, values, and perceptions. Given the proper 
data, GIS can assist with model formation with different 
views of reality. The values are left up to the decision 
makers. Perceptions are the realm of the psyche and 
intuitive cognition and employ a series of bias filters to 
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incoming data. GIS can impact perception by forcing the 
decision maker to deal with the data. Darymple and Parsons 
(2000) stated that "the perceptual process controls both 
the quantity of information received through attention and 
the quality or meaning of information as it is affected by 
bias" (p. 94). For learning to occur and mental models to 
change, Nutt found that "decisions [need to] be discussed 
without [a] blame-finding mentality" (p. 38). GIS can help 
here to objectively present the alternatives and 
situations.
Values both personal and organizational play an 
important role in decision making as evidenced by the works 
of Jacob et al., Harrison, Simon, Murray, and Knight. All 
these authors have a different take on the subject, but 
objectivity is an overriding factor that will help temper 
the analysis. Jacob et al. (1962) found that "values have 
the property of selectivity . . (p. 15). GIS can present
many alternatives for consideration and selection. Harrison 
(1981) compared personal and organizational values and 
found that personal values will influence the search 
activity, (p. 151) Personal values may decide where to look 
or what parameters to include in the analysis, but the data 
could show other views of the situation that if taken
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objectively may override certain preconceptions and cause a 
minor reassessment of the decision maker's values. Although 
Murray (1986) thought it was absurd to assume that value- 
laded goals were achievable through value-free processes, 
GIS can lend rationale and meaning to the pursuit of the 
goals through objectivity, (p. 16) Knight (1964) found that 
people reacted to inferences and not perceptions, (p. 201) 
GIS can help keep the perceptions clear and the inferences 
to a minimum unless justified by the data by displaying 
developing ideas during the decision process. GIS cannot 
assist with physiological or psychological reasons for 
inference-observation confusion described by Haney (1986) 
as fatigue, ". . . emotion and stress, habit and set,
values and needs, and group and social influences" (p. 
221) .
During a time when personnel resources must be pulled 
together quickly, people with the required skills must be 
located quickly. GIS can map out the network of an 
organization's personnel and thematically display them 
according to skill sets. McCall and Kaplan would have said 
that this would help maintain a manager's operational 
network of contacts. The personnel department maintains an 
internal phone list for communications as well as a roster 
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of employees for training and development planning. The 
information technology department maintains a hardware 
inventory list for asset and license management. All of 
these location-based lists could be organized and kept as 
layers in an organizational GIS.
Drucker's (1967) first two elements of an effective 
strategic decision contained problem identification and 
delineation components. (p. 122) Upton, McCall and Kaplan,
and De Geus all suggested trying to detect problems early. 
GIS can help to display what the current situation is where 
operations are being impacted. Murray (1986) described the 
scientific method of causal analysis as binding regions 
artificially so they can be managed and analyzed, (p. 83) 
GIS can do this quite well through thematic layouts. Nutt 
and Drucker both said to fully explore the problem before 
moving on to solve it. GIS have many tools for the 
exploration and display of data. After a sufficient number 
of alternatives have been generated to "expand the pool of 
claims" and "satisfy the specifications of the boundary 
conditions," the decision maker can move to the third 
element and review those alternatives which are acceptable. 
(Drucker 1967, p. 134; Nutt 2002, p. 43) The fourth element 
of implementing the decision is not usually the job of GIS, 
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although it could be used to track work assignments. The 
fifth element ties in with the first and monitors the 
situation as a feedback system by continuing to check 
internal data marts, data warehouses, and external sources 
of data to concretely display past, current, and projected 
conditions.
Context for Success
Before delving further into the subject of alternative 
generation and problem solutions, the issues surrounding 
the context for success should be reviewed to see where GIS 
can and cannot help set the stage. Both Drucker and Luecke 
offered that professional differences of opinion would help 
spur alternatives. GIS cannot manage the attitudes that 
decision makers bring to the table. Harrison (1981) found 
many psychological factors that contributed to the 
cognitive limitation of the decision maker, which are 
listed in Appendix D. (p. 99) Given the decision maker or 
team has sufficiently intelligence and capability, GIS can 
assist with almost all the factors Harrison found. 
Jankowski and Nyerges (2001) agreed and stated that 
"reducing the complexity of a decision problem by reducing 
the cognitive workload of participants is one goal of 
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developing collaborative [DSS]" (p. 4). After the learning 
curve for operating GIS has flattened, time and cost 
factors can become minimized. Memory retention and 
information processing can be offloaded to the GIS. 
Decision makers with closed belief system can only be 
partially helped with GIS; GIS can show possibilities, but 
it is up to the person or group to accept what is offered. 
GIS can help the decision maker to think abstractly if they 
are used to thinking concretely. The last two factors 
involving the decision maker are independent of GIS 
capabilities: risk tolerance, and level of aspiration. Both 
of these affect the amount of information required to make 
a decision. .
Vroom and Jago, Lewin, Witte, and others suggested 
that groups become involved with decision making especially 
in complex situations due to the limitations on the 
individual. GIS can help make the individual decision maker 
more effective and efficient by providing analysis and 
presentations, but the decision maker needs to integrate 
other information and ideas. (Vroom and Jago 1988, p. 99) 
This is echoed by Jankowski and Nyerges (2001) who found 
"increased decision quality and shortened meeting time when 
using GDSS as compared to conventional meetings . . . [as
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well as] high user satisfaction and enhanced decision 
confidence . . (p. 52). GIS usually cannot help the
decision maker select the group unless potential team 
members' capabilities have been recorded in an accessible 
personnel database. Although Luecke made suggestions as to 
the group composition, the choice is up to the decision 
maker. The complexity of the task may require a many groups 
to coordinate in studying various aspects of the problem. 
After the team is selected, then GIS can integrate the 
results into views. Bromley and Coulson (1991) found that 
". . . the data held within a GIS are far more accessible
to staff scattered in different locations . . ." (p. 53).
Power was found to be a force that limited 
alternatives. Nutt (2002) found that power acted earlier to 
restrict the problems being solved, (p. 25) McCall and 
Kaplan (1990) found power to become active in specialized 
groups during the decision process when they "distort 
information to advance the interests of the specialty" (p. 
18). Luecke (2006) found that power was exercised in 
command-and-control cultures limiting the selection of 
alternatives to those in line with a forced direction, (p. 
6) In all of these cases, GIS can become a tool to hinder 
outcomes through the intentional filtering out of valid
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alternatives and views in favor of an interest. To combat
this, Nutt suggested establishing expected results at the 
beginning, (p. 165) Luecke suggested to allow open-minded 
inquiry by asking probing questions and exploring different 
view and options, (p. 19) GIS can assist with this later 
suggestion. McCall and Kaplan also found a subtle power 
that can come not from a dictatorial manger or self-serving 
group, but from time and ". . . someone's perception of the
degree of urgency" required, (p. 62) GIS cannot combat this 
influence except through forecasting of temporal data if 
available to allow the decision maker to reassess their 
perception.
Issue Framing
Now that the stage is set and the subtle and overt 
forces that impinge upon the decision-making process are 
known and accommodated for as much as possible by the GIS, 
the next topic to be reviewed is to see where GIS can and 
cannot help frame the issue properly. In an overview, 
almost the entire process can be assisted by GIS. Framing 
the issue is about understanding what the current and 
desired situation is that caused the perception of the 
issue for the organization. (Pounds 1969, p. 5) The
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situation has gone beyond the do nothing option, and an 
issue has developed that needs a solution. Harrison (1981) 
found that perception will more likely be sharp and defined 
if facts and information are available and studied, (p. 
202) GIS can process many facts into information for the 
decision maker to assist in defining the differences, but 
Drucker (1967) warned first to ensure that the facts are 
relevant to the issue at hand and have a form of 
measurement, (p. 143) GIS have different forms of spatial 
and temporal measurement tools to assist here. Hoos (1972) 
likewise agreed with Drucker and warned the decision maker 
to stop the "... gathering of data more because they are 
available than indicative . . (p. 8). Campbell and
Masser (1995) likewise warned that "information cannot 
simply be thrown at a problem in order to produce 
solutions" (p. 44). GIS can be a negatively enabling tool 
in this regard if not checked.
In setting up the problem frame, Matheson and Matheson 
(1998) found that beliefs and prejudices impact the 
process, (p. 35) GIS cannot manage these psychological 
issues, nor can GIS manage the words used to define the 
frame, which Haney (1986) said could restrict the approach 
to the problem and delay good solutions or produce bad 
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solutions, (pp. 489-491) Another negative use of GIS by a 
decision maker, like the use by a powerful manager, is in 
the support of predetermined conclusions. (Drucker 1967, p. 
144) Managers have been doing this for some time, but GIS 
give them another tool do so. GIS can assist in finding 
beneficial alternatives, but the right question must be 
asked first. (Drucker 1954, p. 351)
Most of Porter's five forces can be modeled in GIS.
Sales, inventory, and location data on the organization's 
products and/or services can be mapped against competitors. 
The threat of potential entry and of substitutes may not 
lend themselves as well as the bargaining power of 
suppliers and of buyers to GIS modeling. The bargaining 
power elements would have more location-based data because 
they are part of the supply chain. If the issue facing the 
organization is not clear, then to help understand the 
problem Luecke (2006) advised to try different frames to 
asses "whether the available information supports your 
theories" (p. 30). Matheson and Matheson (1998) advised 
doing this assessment with "people with different points of 
view" (p. 38). In so doing, a common knowledge about the 
events and realities that people are trying to model can be 
shared until "some optimum number of variables that will 
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help explain the real-world phenomenon being modeled" can 
be understood. (Harrison 1981, p. 52) As De Geus advised, 
it is "the team's model of reality" more than the reality 
itself that is important, (p. 62)
GIS can assist with the modeling process in many ways. 
First, as people explore their ideas in open inquiry, GIS 
can display results and provide feedback on the 
acceptability of the frame under development. Bailey (1994) 
found that exploratory spatial analysis "techniques may 
prove just as useful in analysing model validity as they do 
in suggesting the model in the first place" (p. 19). As 
background for the second way, Luecke found that shrewd 
managers could affect the decision outcome if they could 
get the issue framed according to their agenda, (p. 26) 
McCall and Kaplan (1990) even found power entering the 
process of issue development by means of manipulating "the 
context to achieve political ends—even to the extent of 
keeping secrets and practicing deception" (p. 31). To 
combat these practices, the second way for GIS to assist 
the modeling process is to maintain the objectivity and 
openness of the data so that views and alternatives will be 
available and not hidden and that ideas can be explored in 
the face of attempts to restrict them. Third, as the models 
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are developed, GIS can display temporal data and views to 
"play back and forth management's view of the market, the 
environment, or the competition" (De Geus 1999, p. 61) .
Computers can effectively assist people in generic 
ways, but with the data intensive environment of GIS, 
computers can help to push beyond symptoms to find possible 
causal links. Many definitions of GIS have been 
promulgated, and Longley et al. (2001) offered two 
definitions of GIS as tools "... for revealing what is 
otherwise invisible in geographic information . . . [and]
for performing operations on geographic data that are too 
tedious or expensive or inaccurate if performed by hand . .
(p. 10) De Geus (1999) found that "... most people can 
deal with only three or four variables at a time and do so 
through only one or two time iterations" (p. 62). GIS can 
handle many more variables and cycle through temporal data 
very effectively. Hill et al., Luecke, Nutt, and others 
warned hot to attempt to solve symptoms but to dig for 
causal relationships through time. GIS can assist the two 
kinds of thinking Einhorn and Hogarth (1999) recommended: 
"looking backward to understand the past and looking 
forward to predict the future" (pp. 132-133) .
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Alternative Generation
Once an acceptable frame is chosen, alternatives must 
be generated to see what may work. It is important to 
realize that if no reasonable alternatives are found, the 
decision maker should return and work through the frame 
again rather than accepting a substandard proposal and 
moving forward with it; Nutt (2002) found many errors with 
the idea imposition process if management refuses to return 
to the framing stage. During the alternative generation 
stage, many ideas will compete for acceptance. Drucker 
(1967) found this process healthy and that "... 
disagreement alone can provide alternatives to a decision" 
(p. 150). GIS can display these ideas as they progress.
Drucker, Luecke, and Matheson and Matheson all warned 
that if the alternatives are to be presented to another 
group or person to make the decision, care must be given to 
present a range of alternatives or they are only approving 
and not a deciding. Even GIS can enable this type of error 
by presenting a one-sided case over other alternatives. 
McCall and Kaplan (1990) found where "managers often 
truncate[d the] information search and analysis" possibly 
because they did not have the tools that GIS provides (pp. 
67-68). With the use of GIS, Bromley and Coulson (1991)
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found that "hitherto unknown or untapped data sources 
become available, and information previously ignored 
because of the problems involved in access to that 
information then become available to the decision-maker" 
(pp. 53-54) . March and Simon (1958) found in their day that 
". . . the discovery and selection of satisfactory ..."
rather than optimal alternatives were then best use of 
resources, (pp. 140-141) GIS can now help to raise the bar 
on the optimality of the alternatives generated and reduce 
the magnitude of the process complexity required for their 
generation.
As cause-and-effeet relationships become uncertain, 
Harrison (1981) found that judgment must be used, which 
calls into play a decision maker's value system, (pp. 175- 
176) The lesser one relies on judgment and instead relies 
on objectivity, the less chance bias will be introduced. 
GIS can assist in reducing some of the information 
processing biases presented by Hogarth and Makridakis; 
Appendix G is used for the discussion that follows. GIS can 
show how frequently an event occurs thus reducing 
overstatement errors. If some feature is expected and 
produces a bias towards it, then GIS can help to seek 
alternative features not currently displayed thus reducing 
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the bias. Although McCall and Kaplan (1990) found that 
"people seek information consistent with their own views," 
others involved with the decision process can research and 
display other views, (p. 18) Although a decision maker may 
downplay conflicting information, GIS can still display it. 
GIS have statistical modules making it difficult to have 
samples, with larger than normal standard errors (standard 
deviation of the sample means), be representative of the 
population when this is not the case. A GIS cannot help 
where the issues reside in the human realm. Vivid 
experiences can overcome objectivity and statistically 
validity. The presentation order of the features or views 
has undue importance. GIS cannot assist if people cannot 
apply consistent judgment in similar cases. GIS cannot 
support beliefs in non-valid statistical guesses.
Nutt (2002) and Harrison (1981) both warned of not 
giving sufficient time for information collection thus 
introducing bias and faulty analysis leading to failed 
decisions. Bromley and Coulson (1991) found that "within a 
GIS, complex systems of overlays derived from several data 
bases can be developed and printed rapidly ..." and with 
less expense and time than by other means, (p. 53) GIS can 
get at the more diagnostic information and end the reliance
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of readily available data. (Nutt, p. 77) GIS can extend a 
decision maker's knowledge and information thus overcoming 
what Simon (1976) stated as "one of the limits to 
rationality . . ." (p. 241). Creativity is needed during
the alternative generation phase. GIS can model information 
to display data in many ways to uncover patterns and to see 
"in it something others missed . . ." (Matheson and
Matheson 1998, p. 41).
Thrall (2002) found that "GIS is the data organization 
engine and the vehicle for visualizing the results on a 
map" (p. 86). Dynamically linking views with their 
underlying tables can allow for insight to come through 
exploration of the spatial data. (Longley et al. 2001, p. 
285) GIS can capture the brainstorming process recommended 
by many authors by saving, as Hill et al. stated, "all 
possible alternatives to the problem solution" in separate 
maps or views, (p. 23) During this process, views can be 
grouped for further inquiry; those with little difference 
can be combined or eliminated later. Only later will the 
alternatives be subjected to the analytical modules of GIS 
to screen out what is not feasible (Mintzberg et al. 1976, 
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p. 257) yet retain sufficiently numerous reasonable 
contenders for selection. (Matheson and Matheson, pp. 42- 
43)
Groups lend a certain amount of complexity to the 
decision process by means coordination and idea transfer. 
Whether remotely or in closed session, group GIS (GGIS) or 
participatory GIS (PGIS) can facilitate the process if the 
decision team is not physically together, or a standard GIS 
can serve to record idea themes for later analysis. These 
tools can help the initial decision process phases of fact 
finding and information sharing where members can work 
together or independently in committees, task forces, 
conferences, and boards. (Kell and Corts 1980, pp. 10-17) 
Luecke and Heirs advised that certain skills must be 
exercised by the group leader, such as drawing out 
contributions from shy members even if these contributions 
are not well formed. Many of these skills are 
interpersonal, and GIS cannot help in this regard. Kell and 
Corts found "that group members tend to be better satisfied 
working under a leader skilled in human relations . . .
than one skilled in solving problems" (p. 158). With this 
being the case, GIS would be thought to be tasked with 
picking up more of the problem solving tasks; software can 
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only do so much. A GIS can help to minimize the effect of 
rank and credibility on the acceptance of a particular view 
by displaying it and determining if it matches reality. 
(McCall and Kaplan 1990, p. 31)
GIS can better be used in a group setting using the
Van de Van and Delbecq's NGT or statistical pooling 
discussed by Hill et al. GIS can be set up on servers so 
that idea contributors can work independently on shared 
data. Views can be generated with a contributor's identity 
masked so that each idea to enter the group's problem­
solving efforts and not have to be challenged on the way 
in. (Hoffman 1982, p. 116) Masking might be necessary to 
limit idea proposal biases when the reviewer is a superior. 
(Ference 1970, p. B-85) Even if the proposals are not 
masked, GIS can minimize the undue weight given to 
information because of the provider's position, location, 
or frequency of use; either the information will be 
objectively useful or not. (Ference, B-85) Once the ideas 
have entered the decision process, then patterns and causal 
analysis can be done to project future trends. Einhorn and 
Hogarth (1999) gave four cues to find causal variables that 
match up nicely with the capabilities of GIS: temporal 
order, proximity, correlation, and similarity, (p. 136)
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Alternative Evaluation
After the alternatives have been generated, the main 
evaluation can begin. Of the three categories of decision 
theories that March and Simon (1958) discussed, certainty 
is the easiest for GIS to map because "complete and 
accurate knowledge of the consequences" are known for each 
alternative, (p. 137) It would just be a matter or modeling 
the data and generating features and views, and the number 
of views would be less than with risky or uncertain 
alternatives. When the future is less certain, as it 
usually is, risk comes to bear and causes alternatives to 
have probabilities of occurrence attached. It makes little 
difference whether a GIS has certainty or a probability 
attached to an alternative; GIS will create views of the 
alternatives. Although uncertain alternatives may cause 
some stress for the decision maker, they only need to work 
with GIS to make more views for analysis. Working with GIS 
statistical modules may lead to inferences causing a shift 
away from uncertainty towards risk assessment and the 
assignment of probabilities. Wilson and Alexis (1962) 
discussed "closed" and "open" frameworks for use with more 
or less precise data respectively, (pp. 150-151) GIS can 
help bridge the gap between the two frameworks by 
153
developing warrants allowing closed-type analyses to 
provide evidence to the claims of the open models requiring 
more complex analytical constructs.
In assessing new ways to compete, Upton (1998) 
promoted flexibility, which can take the form of new supply 
chain configurations, delivery routes, etc. (p. 131) 
Lummus, Vokurka, and Krumwiede (2008) studied supply chain 
integration and found that higher levels led "to improved 
performance and faster and more reliable delivery 
performance . . ."in many areas including lower supply
chain costs, increased order fulfillment speed, delivery 
speed, and delivery flexibility, (pp. 59-60) GIS can assist 
to develop these new business processes even though they 
may be risky or uncertain. Hill et al. (1979) found that 
when precise information is available then more traditional 
tools could be used, such as linear programming and linear 
regression, and forecasting, to arrive at objective 
decisions, (p. 24) GIS offer some of these analysis 
features as modules or can easily be programmed to perform 
the tasks.
Due to the way GIS can process most data in complex 
datasets, GIS can show patterns and oddities thereby 
assisting the decision maker to heed Einhorn and Hogarth's 
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(1999) warning to not "underestimate the importance of 
random factors in the environment" (p. 145). Drucker (1954) 
warned the decision maker to combine traditional economic 
analysis with trend analysis to form the correct questions 
of why, how likely, and how fast future events may occur.
(pp. 91-93) GIS can help with some of the economic analysis 
and most of the trend analysis. Courtney et al. (1999) 
discussed the evaluation of alternatives and forecasts and 
stated that "this approach serves well in relatively stable 
business environments" (p. 3). When these environments 
experience an increasing rate of change, this advice would 
be well heeded if regular analysis is used. GIS can be used 
to process more complex data and thus increase the rate of 
change of the analysis to compensate for the changes in the 
environment to a point. Pang and Shi (2002) developed a 
process-based model focused on "the spatial processes 
instead of map layers" that allow for rapid update of 
structures as movements occur, (p. 341) Further development 
and implementation of this model will provide many options 
for alternative exploration and pattern recognition for the 
decision maker.
Many ideas are generated with NGT and brainstorming 
techniques, but with cases of general analysis or
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uncertainty, decision makers were found to desire more 
information than may have been required. (Harrison 1981, p. 
16, McCall and Kaplan 1990, p. 6) GIS offer great tools to 
explore options and build layers of information, but GIS 
should not become a license for a fishing expedition. The 
decision maker needs to stay focused because as Hogarth and 
Makridakis (1981) pointed out, extra information only ". .
. increases confidence in judgment, it does not necessarily 
increase predictive accuracy" (p. 127). GIS can assist with 
an issue Harrison found where "individuals seem unable to 
make full use of information, especially when it is 
multidimensional" (p. 6).
Some of the recommendations Nutt (2002) made for 
preventing blunders can be assisted by GIS: investigate 
claims, search for ideas, and assess risk. (p. 6) GIS 
cannot assist with Nutt's other recommendations: set 
objectives, measure benefits, and manage social and 
political forces, (p. 6) GIS can help to limit what Nutt 
found as the manipulation of risk by decision makers, less 
concerned with objectivity than with pushing a specific 
outcome, by displaying the possible scenarios for objective 
discussion, (p. 58) These scenarios might be the proximity 
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to flood planes or extent of competitor penetration in the 
market being considered.
Even the best analysis will have some uncertain 
elements because "information ... is always incomplete or 
imperfect" (Harrison 1981, p. 34). Courtney et al. (1999) 
explored the question of how to deal with uncertainty that 
remained and found a four-level systematic approach that 
could be modeled with GIS. (p. 5) Starting with the least 
amount of uncertainty and moving towards the abyss of the 
unknown, Courtney et al. described the clear-enough future, 
alternative futures, a range of futures, and true 
ambiguity, (pp. 5-7) In developing the models for these 
approaches, Matheson and Matheson (1998) found that "in 
lieu of unobtainable facts, decision makers must make do 
with [objective and reliable] information that provides 
insight into the future" (p. 44). There will be times when 
this is not possible, and this will typically occur with 
higher levels of uncertainty. GIS can develop models from 
whatever information it is given as factual propositions as 
long as it has a locational component. Simon (1976) then 
stated that those models may be evaluated to see "... 
whether what they say about the world actually occurs, or 
whether it does not" (p. 46). If it does not currently
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occur, Harrison advised to test each alternative ". . . by
imagining [through GIS] that it has already been put into 
effect" (p. 38).
GIS can model trends to forecast the clear-enough 
direction. The use of GIS expands with the level of 
uncertainty. Alternative futures will be determined through 
probability analysis and the development of various 
valuation models. GIS can develop a range of futures from 
the probable outcomes of ". . .a limited number of key 
variables ..." (Courtney et al. 1999, p. 9). Although 
Courtney et al. advised against developing more than five 
alternative scenarios, GIS can offload this mental 
processing and keep track of as many scenarios as desired 
in separate views and layers for delegated analysis by 
different team members or by different teams, (p. 14) True 
ambiguity offers the least chance of GIS being effective 
because "... outcomes cannot be predicted, even in 
probabilistic terms" either because they are not known or 
are sufficiently difficult to ferret out. (Hill et al. 
1979, p. 114) The use of GIS at this point becomes a 
guessing game. Assuming that GIS have provided useful 
assistance in moving the decision process along and allowed 
many alternatives to be objectively evaluated, the next 
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step is to see where GIS can assist in the choice of the 
best alternative.
Peters (1987) discussed information's power to affect 
decision making through its widespread availability and 
visible posting, (p. 612) GIS synthesize disparate data 
into visually concise and comprehensible output ready for 
incorporation into reports or display on the internet. 
Campbell and Masser (1995) found the main advantage of GIS 
". . .as the ability to integrate data sets from a wide 
variety of sources and ... to make this information more 
widely accessible . . ." (p. 33)-. Jankowski and Nyerges
(2001) likewise found in their study of PGIS that "being 
able to bring disparate sources of information together 
from various organizations is seen as a major advantage in 
the use of PGIS" (p. 51). This would "have significant 
implications for the ownership and control of information 
and consequently the distribution of power" (Campbell and 
Masser, p. 43).
Luecke, Ference, and Nutt found where biases affect 
decision making though the control of information. GIS will 
process and display data according to given instructions. 
This can play into the hands of the unscrupulous manager 
promoting their confirming-evidence bias through the 
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seeking of evidence to support a position and dismissing or 
overlooking of evidence to oppose or contrast a position. 
(Luecke 2006, p. 34) Information is typically shared during 
the decision process, and Ference (1970) found biases in 
the control of information before and during transmission, 
(p. B-84) These types of biases are hard for GIS to 
compensate for because there is no way for GIS to know what 
is required; GIS would treat the adjustment as another view 
of the information.
If the decision team is acting in good conscience to 
try to combat bias, Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) suggested 
three processes to lower bias. The first process was to 
propose an idea after checking a wide base of data, and 
then try to find information that will disconfirm it. (p. 
121) This process is different than enacting a confirming­
evidence bias because Wason (1960) stated that "in general, 
scientific inferences are based on the principle of 
eliminating hypotheses . . (p. 129). Nutt (2002) agreed
with Pruitt (1961) and both warned against deciding or 
taking a position early. GIS can allow the decision maker 
to explore many options and variations, do proximity 
analysis, and add layers to check their original 
assumptions.
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Second process Hogarth and Makridakis (1981) suggested 
was that information should be aggregated mechanically 
where possible, (p. 121) This will help to eliminate the 
human error component provided the data are input, labeled, 
and joined correctly. TPS can provide input data for GIS 
enabling a good statistical base to support analysis, such 
as Poisson chi square mapping. Other high-level systems, 
such as Computer Aided Facility Management (CAFM), can 
provide data for GIS as most of the data are location 
based; CAFM systems track physical assets, manage real 
estate portfolios, and determine cost allocations among 
other functions. (McPartland 2003, p. 14) Castle (1993) 
found that "... approximately 80 percent of all types of 
information have a locational component . . (p. 86). The
third process suggested was to carefully review the results 
and accurately determine causal relationships, (p. 121) GIS 
modules, such as Arcinfo Geostatistical Analyzer, can 
provide some correlations, but it is up the user to 
interpret and correctly label the causal relationships that 
will be used for decisions later.
Communication and group interaction when deliberating 
an idea are critical the decision process. GIS can help to 
keep the discussions objective, but this must extend to the
161
control of the layers and views produced. Luecke (2006) 
warned of anchoring around an initial, position for the 
purpose of negotiations, (p. 99) GIS must be allowed to 
explore all options "... which will fully satisfy the 
specifications [of the problem] before attention is given 
to the compromises, adaptations, and concessions needed to 
make the decision acceptable . . (Drucker 1967, pp. 122-
123). After GIS assists in providing the alternatives, then 
deliberations and judgments can be made about 
acceptability. Cook and Hammond (1982) found that the main 
dysfunctional group issues pertained to the inconsistent 
processing of information and of group member positions and 
judgments, (p. 9) GIS can consistently process data for 
clarity and normalization of analysis over time (apples to 
apples). GIS can assist in recording group member positions 
in the form of views, which can be retrieved later for 
review. The recording of judgments may not be handled as 
well by GIS; views can be created from judgments, and some 
metadata can be recorded stating the reasons for the 
judgments.
Biases that come from the group or individual can 
affect the alternative selection process. Ference (1970) 
found that when the information entered the decision
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process, from whom it came, .and its content affected how it 
was subsequently altered, (p. B-85) GIS can keep track of 
these items and keep the process objective, but it cannot 
alter the human psyche as it relates to these issues. It 
should not matter if the front line supervisor or the vice 
president provided some information; it should matter if 
their assumptions bear out in realty. Computers do not care 
about human feelings; they only process and display 
information. Even so, Janis .(1971) found that when 
groupthink is happening, ". . .it tends to override
realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action" (p. 
43). GIS can combat this only through an objective review 
of the data and to have someone strong enough to "challenge 
the assumptions and conclusions of the majority" (Luecke 
2006, p. 121). Sometimes the evaluation of the decision 
leads in direction that is not currently possible to take. 
Provided the aspects of bias and political control over the 
process have sufficiently been neutralized, Lowi (1979) 
stated that "laws set priorities" (p. 92).
Alternative Choice
Decision rules can be used to help set the decision 
direction. Three decision rules can help determine the 
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decision outcome based on expectations of the 
organization's efforts and those competitors or controlling 
forces: maximax, maximin, and minimax. (Heirs 1987, p. 83;
Hill et al. 1979, p. 130) GIS can model any of these 
situations given the proper data-; it is up to the decision 
maker to assign probabilities of outcomes. Hill et al. 
found that these rules do not account for changes in 
forecast parameters and thus should be used in stable 
markets, (p. 130) Management scholars may revisit these 
rules to see if GIS and current computing capabilities can 
now incorporate changes in forecast parameters for 
application to more dynamic markets. Harrison (1981) did 
offer the dissenting opinion on maximizing and found the 
underlying assumptions to faulty because of two main items: 
the lack of perfect information, and many variables 
required for maximization are hard to quantify, (p. 92) GIS 
can attempt to provide missing data through proximity 
analysis and kriging, and can assign attributes to data; 
unless quantities are known for some variables, some GIS 
modules cannot be used.
Decisions are not always based on certainty. Tan et 
al. (2006) and Kosko (1993) offered fuzzy logic as a method 
for managing uncertainty and finding a point when enough
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information has been obtained for a valid decision.
Matheson and Matheson (1998)' agreed and found that "... 
decision quality rarely requires great precision . . . " (p.
49). Woodcock and Gopal (2000) found fuzzy set theory used 
among other things to model human decision making. "Fuzzy 
sets are increasingly being used in GIS" (p. 154). Jiang 
and Eastman (2000) found that "the logic of fuzzy sets 
bridges a major gap between [the multi-criteria evaluation 
approaches of] Boolean assessment and continuous scaling in 
weighted linear combination"- (p. 176) . GIS can use data 
mining, cluster analysis, and proximity analysis to design 
fuzzy GIS with fuzzy sets and patches based on the decision 
maker's model of reality. Part of the design has to do with 
accepting ". . . varying degrees of membership in map
classes for a single map polygon . . ." (Woodcock and Gopal
2000, p. 155). Accepting this and relaxing some of ". . .
the restrictions imposed by classical set theory .... 
[will allow] queries regarding areas meeting certain 
criteria, or membership levels" instead of only the area of 
each class. (Woodcock and Gopal 2000, p. 170) This is 
currently accomplished "in a map overlay procedure [where] 
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the intersection or union of various map categories is 
determined and their area measured" (Woodcock and Gopal 
2000, p. 170).
The point at which a choice is made has changed from 
the completion of a thorough and exhaustive analysis to the 
collection of enough information to trigger the choice. 
Care must be given though to follow the Discovery Process 
Nutt (2002) proposed so that the Idea Imposition Process 
does take over thus causing problems (See Appendix C). 
Eilon (1969) observed that the analysis of the information 
should be penetrating enough to allow the alternatives to 
be ranked by an agreed upon criterion, (p. B-178)
When the alternatives are narrowed to the final 
candidates of what will satisfy the conditions of the 
problem and negotiations are in progress to determine what 
is acceptable, Hill et al. (1979) and Lewin's (1935) 
research on conflict will play a role in the outcome. GIS 
can only assist in these interpersonal matters to display 
the aspects of the alternatives under deliberation. Whether 
or not all the members on the decision making team agree if 
enough information has been collected, when it comes time 
to make the choice Hill et al. found two ways to help with 
the conflicts. First, GIS can help to simplify the set of 
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choice through aggregation or other imposed frameworks, (p. 
63) Second, GIS cannot help the decision maker "maintain or 
restore consistency among the several attitudes, beliefs, 
and values that are part of his personal context" (p. 64).
Aside from the interpersonal issues, GIS can become 
involved in most of the decision processes from definition, 
generation and exploration, evaluation, to implementation. 
Although implementation was not included in the scope for 
this paper, it could be tracked by assigning color codes or 
other feature identifying markers to the layers, views or 
parts thereof to delineate responsibilities and progress. 
GIS offer management a tool that can assist decision making 
is many ways. As with any tool, one must learn how to use 
it be effective, and one must learn its dangers and 
safeguards to prevent organizational injury from misuse.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSION
This paper researched the many facets of the decision­
making process from the beginning through to just before 
the implementation phase. It looked at the values that 
drive perspectives, the objective criteria that must be 
met, the politics and power plays involved in directing 
activities, and the internal and external factors that come 
to bear upon the individual or group decision makers as 
they move through the process. It was found that GIS can 
support decisions quite effectively where location data are 
present through spatial and temporal mapping of current and 
future situations and scenarios. This support is readily 
available because Castle (1993) found that ". . .
approximately 80 percent of all types of information have a 
locational component . . ." (p. 86). Weilar (1993) found
that GIS enable different and new ways of perceiving 
business fundamentals, achieving higher levels of 
productivity, and generating new ideas, (p. 5) Moloney, 
Lea, and Kowalchuk (1993) likewise noted the beneficial 
effects of GIS on performance and profitability, (pp. 109- 
110) Bromley and Coulson (1991) added more support to this
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claim by finding that GIS contributed to improvements in 
operations by quickly bringing additional data to 
effectively bear upon the issues, (p. 55)
The normative approach to decision making flows 
through a specific process of identifying issues to 
address, generating and evaluating alternatives to address 
those issues that when followed will yield a thorough 
investigation of the issue on which to base a choice. Many 
forces both internal and external will attempt to shorten 
the path for supposed rational reasons usually resulting in 
a less than desirable and sometimes detrimental outcome. 
GIS were found to help keep the decision process on track 
thus yielding a quality decision. To set the context for 
success correctly, the communication channels and the 
involvement of the necessary parties to the decision should 
be thought out and established by the manager. After this 
is done, GIS were found to support communications through 
GGIS or any variation of the space-time meeting venues that 
Jankowski and Nyerges (2001) explored, (p. 49) GIS were 
found to assist the decision maker to overcome most of the 
psychological factors listed in Appendix D, which if not 
addressed would limit the cognitive abilities of decision 
makers. GIS were found to objectively open up the 
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possibilities for discussion while limiting the amount of 
office politics involved. Perceptions can be altered 
through a fresh look at information objectively derived 
from data.
The next step of framing the issue was found to be 
aided by GIS through the use of its spatial and temporal 
tools to explore the scope of the issue. Time is a useful 
tool to see the progressive or cyclical nature of a 
problem. GIS can use Pang and Shi's (2002) model to see 
rapidly changing events or use more standard displays of 
static information to arrive at a frame, (p. 341) De Geus 
and Einhorn and Hogarth advised to look historically and 
project trends. GIS were found to do this openly until a 
frame is agreed upon by the decision team. Worrall (1991) 
provided some potential uses of geographic information in a 
public policy setting in Appendix H.
Inherent with frame development is the processing of 
spatial and temporal data until the problem becomes clear, 
which GIS were found to do quite well. This carries over to 
the generation of alternatives. GIS save views in separate 
files that can be recalled and displayed upon demand 
thereby enabling the collection of many alternatives for 
later evaluation. Priorities can change in the turbulent 
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business environment and during times of governmental 
regulatory reformation. GIS can recall previously saved 
alternatives to quickly get back on track after an 
emergency has passed. As the process of generating of 
alternatives unfolds, GIS were found to quickly process 
disparate and previously unused (due to lack of access) 
sources of data to uncover previously unknown patterns and 
possibly uncover causal relationships that would extend a 
decision maker's knowledge and information to overcome what 
Simon (1976) stated as "one of the limits to rationality .
. ." (p. 241). Most decisions require data form different
areas of the organizations, and Moloney et al. (1993) 
provided some generic sources of data available to an 
organization in Appendix I. Landis (1993) found that "most 
business planning decisions are fundamentally spatial. . .
Because GIS is designed to process and display spatial 
data, it can be extremely useful for long-term business 
planning and decision making" (p. 24).
Einhorn and Hogarth (1999) stated that causal 
relationships can be found through temporal order, 
proximity, correlation, and similarity, (p. 136) GIS were 
found to have these analysis capabilities at there core. 
GIS were found to assist in reducing biases listed in
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Appendix G especially in the ability to process data.
Complex business decisions add to the cognitive load a 
decision maker must carry when performing their duties. GIS 
were found to serve as a vehicle to carry some of this 
burden thus freeing up cognitive capacity and allowing for 
more creative approaches to problem solving. GIS were found 
to make use of both predictive and descriptive models to 
allow this creativity. Landis (1993) found that "by 
bringing the dimensions of space and location into the 
decision-making process" GIS were found to enhance business 
productivity by reducing costs, improving the quality of 
goods and services, and expanding the market, (p. 51) 
Landis though found GIS had its largest impact on the 
ability to improve "the quality of information used by 
business managers to make key design, product, marketing, 
and management decisions. . . without necessarily adding
complexity" (p. 51).
The tools that allow GIS to assist in the generation 
of alternatives were also found to assist in the evaluation 
of alternatives. As each alternative is developed, a 
probability of occurrence can be assigned and notated on 
the map. GIS were found in some cases to lead the decision 
maker out of uncertainty towards risk assessment through 
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its analysis tools. When the available data are more 
precise, "closed" analysis frameworks can be utilized; less 
precise data require more exploratory "open" frameworks. 
(Wilson and Alexis 1962, pp. 150-151) In more complex 
analyses requiring a two-step approach, GIS were found to 
work in both frameworks; closed-type analyses could provide 
input for the open-type analyses that would follow. These 
usually multi-dimensional problems require a diverse 
information set, which Harrison (1981) found individuals 
unable to utilize to its fullest, (p. 6) GIS though was 
found to effectively integrate and process multi­
dimensional data whether it was temporal or from disparate 
sources. (Campbell and Masser 1995, p. 33; Janlowski and 
Nyerges 2001, p. 51)
The various tools that GIS can bring to bear on the 
analysis were found to support the process of establishing
. scientific inferences [that] are based on the 
principle of eliminated hypotheses ..." (Wason 1960, p. 
129). GIS were found to assist this process by testing each 
facet of a hypothesis in a separate view ". . . by
imagining that it has already been put into effect" 
(Harrison 1981, p. 38). This projection along with the 
mechanical aggregation of information that Hogarth and
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Makridakis (1981) suggested are two processes that allow 
GIS to combat and lower bias in decision making, (p. 121)
GIS were found to reduce misconceptions and 
miscommunication of results and positions of group members 
through consistency and objectivity. Cook and Hammond 
(1982) found that issues surfaced due to inconsistencies in 
the processing of information, (p. 9) GIS will record 
results and positions in views for later recall if 
questions arise. Another area of dysfunctional analysis 
comes from groupthink, which "... override[s] realistic 
appraisal of alternative courses of action" (Janis 1971, p. 
43). GIS were found to embolden the group member, 
recognizing that groupthink was occurring, to take Luecke's 
(2006) suggestion to "challenge the assumptions and 
conclusions of the majority"- (p. 121) .
The final step in the decision-making process for this 
paper is the choice phase. All that has gone into the 
preparation of the alternatives brings the choice to one 
that may require negotiation to effect acceptability. GIS 
were found to serve as an effective communication and 
presentation tool with the ability to produce maps of 
alternatives for dissemination to the affected parties or 
to the organization as a whole through the internet, 
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intranet, or tradition print media. Absolute certainty 
rarely exists. (Wilson and Alexis 1962, p. 154) The choice 
often becomes that of what probability the decision maker 
chooses to accept. GIS can display maps of the alternatives 
with their corresponding probabilities under consideration, 
but developments in fuzzy logic can assist the decision­
making process to display the more correct or more 
acceptable alternative using certain user parameters.
The latest research in GIS has been to incorporate 
fuzzy logic to deal with issues of data heterogeneity, of 
data accuracy, of the impracticality of precise data, and 
of lack of the need for optimality. As with all fuzzy 
systems, which are controlled by the decision maker, the 
preponderance of the warrants that relate the evidence to 
the claim will lead to one choice over another. Fuzzy 
systems have been found to be incorporated in GIS to show 
when enough information has been collected in order to make 
the choice.
More research needs to be done in the area of GIS, as 
a management tool for decision making, to bring it into the 
mainstream of regular practice and application to today's 
problems. The current research is focused on specifics of 
functionality of GIS as a technical tool. While this is 
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important as a technical issue, today's managers do not 
seem to think visually. With the ever increasing 
capabilities of computers, GIS should take it rightful 
place in the workplace as a tool for modeling issues and 
solutions. This paper concludes that GIS is an important 
tool in the decision maker's arsenal to deal with complex 
issues with locational components.
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APPENDIX A
HOW BLUNDERS PROMPT TRAPS
Traps Failure-Prone Practice Blunder
Premature 
Commitment Blunder
Misuse of Resources 
Blunder
Failing to take 
charge by 
reconciling 
claims
Support for claims and 
its arena of action 
assumed by the 
decision maker
First claim (or 
claimant) that seems 
important is accepted
Failure to look for 
hidden concerns or 
considerations and the 
more pressing claims 
that they suggest
Ignoring 
barriers to 
action
Power and persuasion 
used to implement 
decisions
Action taken before 
social and political 
forces are understood
Interests and 
commitments of 
stakeholders go 
unexplored
Providing 
ambiguous 
directions
Direction assumed and 
never clarified
Unwilling to 
acknowledge a 
concern without 
offering a remedy
Little time spent to 
identify desired results
Limiting search A quick fix or what 
others are doing is 
adopted
Pressure for answers 
makes the conspicuous 
solution seem timely 
and pragmatic
Little spent on a search 
for ideas or for 
innovation
Misusing 
evaluation
Evaluation used to 
measure costs, 
ignoring benefits
Defensive evaluation 
used to justify the 
conspicuous solution
Money spent 
defending ideas and 
not in exploring their 
risk
Overlooking 
ethical 
questions
Values behind ethical 
questions are 
overlooked
All decisions are seen 
as ethically neutral
No time or money 
spent uncovering 
values
Failing to learn Fail to see how 
perverse incentives 
operate to cover up 
outcomes
Expectations demand 
good outcomes
Few resources used to 
learn or to do so 
without removing 
perverse incentives
Reprinted with permission of the publisher. From p. 24 of Why Decisions Fail, copyright® 
2002 by Paul C. Nutt, Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Inc., San Francisco, CA. All rights 
reserved, www.kbconnection.com
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APPENDIX B
PRACTICES THAT AVOID THE TRAPS
Traps to be Avoided Best Practice Steps Required
Failing to take 
charge by 
reconciling claims
Network with stakeholders Involve stakeholders to uncover and 
reconcile concerns or considerations 
or to formulate the claim
Ignoring barriers to 
action
Intervention or 
participation
Demonstrate the need to act and ways 
to consider the interests and 
commitment of stakeholders
Allowing ambiguous 
directions
Set objectives Create clear picture of expected results
Limiting search Innovation or search Increase the number of options 
considered and those with potential 
first mover advantages
Misusing evaluation Explore risk and compare 
the benefits of the options
Expose options with unacceptable risk 
and validate the choice
Overlooking ethical 
questions
Look for important values 
and offer mediation
Uncover and confront the ethical 
questions of internal and external 
stakeholders
Failing to learn from 
the decision-making 
experience
Create win-win situations 
for all stakeholders
Look for and remove perverse 
incentives and encourage honest 
appraisal of company actions
Reprinted with permission of the publisher. From p. 28 of Why Decisions Fail, copyright® 
2002 by Paul C. Nutt, Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Inc., San Francisco, CA. All rights . 
reserved, www.kbconnection.com
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APPENDIX C
SHIFTS BETWEEN THE TWO DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
Discovery Process Idea Imposition Process
Reprinted with permission of the publisher. From p. 54 of Why Decisions Fail, 
copyright® 2002 by Paul C. Nutt, Berrett-Koehler Publishers. Inc., San Francisco, CA. 
All rights reserved, www.kbconnection.com
182
APPENDIX D
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE
COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS OF DECISION MAKERS
183
APPENDIX D
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS OF DECISION MAKERS
• Human decision makers can retain only a few bits of 
information in short-term memory.
• The intelligence of the decision maker appears to be a 
limiting factor in processing and retaining information. 
More intelligent decision makers seem better able to cope 
with high loads of information processing.
• Dogmatic decision makers (that is, those with closed 
belief systems) tend to unduly restrict the amount of 
information they are willing to process, thereby limiting 
their cognitive processes.
• Decision makers who tend to think in concrete rather than 
abstract terms tend to be somewhat limited in their 
ability to process information.
• A decision maker's willingness to accept risk may limit 
the amount of information required to arrive at a choice. 
Risk takers may require less information than risk 
avoiders.
• A decision maker's level of aspiration influences the 
amount of information he or she needs to arrive at a 
choice. If the level is high, the decision maker may 
require more information; if the level is low, the 
decision maker may need less information. Consequently, 
the level of aspiration represents another special type 
of cognitive limitation.
• In general, older decision makers appear to have more 
cognitive limitations on handling information in a 
decision-making situation than younger decision makers.
Source: p. 99 of Harrison, E. F./The Managerial Decision- 
Making Process/2nd edition/Copyright 1981 by Houghton 
Mifflin Company. Used with permission.
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APPENDIX E
TYPES OF ATTRIBUTES
• Nominal: Serves only to identify or distinguish one 
instance of a class of entities from other members of the 
same class.
Example: Numbers, letters, colors, place-names
• Ordinal: Values have a natural order. No mathematic 
manipulation is possible. Only median may yield value.
Example: Classification designations, ranking
• Interval: Differences between values makes sense
Example: Temperature
• Ratio: Ratios between values makes sense
Example: Weight
• Cyclic: directional data including flow direction on a 
map, or compass direction, or longitude. Problems exist 
due to data type limits, such as 360 degrees for a 
compass; 361 degree does not exist as a convention as it 
would be the same as 1 degree.
Example: Degrees
Source: Longley et al. (2001, p. 66)
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APPENDIX F
SPATIAL ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES
• Analysis of Data Related to Points
o Spatial query
• Geocoding
• Proximal analysis
o Dot-density mapping
o Nearest-neighbor
• Analysis of Data Related to Lines
o Network analysis
• Flow analysis
• Routing
• Optimum path analysis
• Analysis of Data Related to Polygons
o Polygon processing
• Point-in-polygon
• Choroplethic mapping
• Polygon overlay
o Polygonization
• Spatial aggregation
• Buffering
Source: Huxhold (1991, pp. 57-61)
188
APPENDIX G
A FEW OF THE MANY INFORMATION PROCESSING BIASES
189
APPENDIX G
A FEW OF THE MANY INFORMATION PROCESSING BIASES
Bias/Source of Bias Description/Example
Availability • If a person can easily recall specific instances of an event, 
he/she may overestimate how frequently the event occurs 
(and vice versa).
• Chance events or cues can hinder or help by pointing a 
person in a particular direction.
Selective Perception • What one expects to see biases what one does see.
• People seek information consistent with their own views.
• People, downplay information that conflicts with a 
consistent profile.
Concrete Information • Vivid, direct experience dominates abstract information; 
a single personal experience can outweigh more valid 
statistical information.
Data Presentation • The items presented first (primacy) or last (recency) in a 
series assume undue importance.
• Whether information is collected sequentially or all at 
once affects what is processed.
Inconsistency • People have trouble applying a consistent judgmental 
strategy across similar cases, even though they believe 
they are consistent.
Law of Small
Numbers
• Small samples are deemed representative of the larger 
population (a few cases “prove the rule”), even when they 
are not.
Complexity • Under time pressure, processing of complex information 
may be quite superficial.
Gambler’s Fallacy • Seeing an unexpected number of similar chance events 
leads to belief that an event not seen will occur (e.g., after 
observing 9 successive reds in roulette, believing chances 
for a black on the next roll are greater than 50/50).
Source: Condensed and adapted by McCall and Kaplan (1990, 
p. 18) from Hogarth and Makridakis (1981, pp. 117-120).
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APPENDIX H
POTENTIAL USES OF GEOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
IN A PUBLIC POLICY SETTING
• More sensitive monitoring of change in demographic, social, economic, ecological 
and environmental conditions
• Developing a better understanding of the processes of change
• More accurate forecasting of the changing needs for publicly provided services, such 
as schools, housing, community facilities, leisure and transport
• More precise identification of spatial variations in living conditions as a basis for the 
development of social policy and the more precise targeting of local government 
resources
• More rigorous identification of target markets for promotion of local services and the 
generation of income
• More attractive and responsive service planning by more accurately identifying the 
determinants of demand and by more expertly forecasting the changing pattern of 
need for services as a basis for setting priorities in the deployment of resources
• Improving the quality of service management by developing more efficient and 
economical approaches for undertaking activities, such as refuse collection, landscape 
maintenance and route scheduling
• Improving the cost of effectiveness of asset management by developing more 
accurate property systems and asset registers
• Improving statutory planning processes by developing the means for modeling and 
simulating alternative scenarios and by developing the techniques to asses the 
suitability or conformance of development proposals in the context of statutory plans
• Improving the policy-making process by developing more sensitive methods for the 
evaluation and analysis of policies and programmes
SOURCE: Worrall (1991, pp. 2-3)
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TYPICAL ORGANIZATIONAL LOCATION-BASED DATA
Generated Internally
• Product performance data, or the amount of each product 
sold by each channel and by each location
• Distribution data, or lists of distribution points for 
each product and attributes of each distributor
• Sales territory data, or the definition of territories 
and the resources allocated to each
• Survey data, or data that are purchasing, attitudinal, or 
behavioral in nature
• Marketing/advertising expenditure distribution within and 
across markets
Obtained Externally
• Socio-economic and demographic variables
• Demographic and product usage estimates and projection 
data
• Census and postal geographic centroid and boundary files
• Street-based address information
• Physical data, such as rivers, streams, shorelines, land 
use, etc.
• Retail and distribution locations
SOURCE: Moloney, Lea, and Kowalchuk (1993, pp. 109-110)
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